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I. INTRODUCTION
The numbers are staggering. Employees have lost an unbelievable
amount of money in the last three years alone by investing their livelihoods
on what was once thought to be a safe bet-their companies. The likes of
Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, HealthSouth, and others wiped out their
workers' stock-based savings plans upon revelations of accounting
improprieties and other fraudulent activities. However, despite the flood of
1. LOREN FOX, ENRON: THE RISE AND FALL 290 (John Wiley & Sons 2003) [hereinafter
ENRON: THE RISE AND FALL].
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litigation surrounding these entities accused of securities fraud, restitution
for many employees may not materialize given the current statutory
framework and concurrent pending bankruptcy proceedings. Employee
investors are hardest hit, suffering tremendous losses by way of vanished
retirement funds and worthless stock compensation instead of reaping the
promised huge rewards in return for their hard work and dedication to the
corporation under fire. Yet their opportunities for recovery are restricted
and often leave some plaintiffs without any legal recourse against those who
have compromised their financial security. Furthermore, the recent
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a direct response to the wave of scandals, only widens
the doors slightly for future victims of fraud by their own corporations and
does little for current victims. The law has not made significant progress to
prevent similar future harm, and employee shareholders will likely continue
to suffer irrecoverable losses at the hands of corporate directors.
In reaction to the recent scandals, Congress enacted the Public Company
Accounting Reform and Corporate Responsibility Act, also known as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as a response to and a system of avoiding such horrors
in the future.2 However, Sarbanes-Oxley mainly speaks to pure securities
violations: its express purpose is to "protect investors by improving the
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the
securities laws, and for other purposes."3 Certainly employees along with
public investors in corporate securities will benefit from the new
requirements and improvements set forth in Sarbanes-Oxley, but the fact of
the matter is that many categories of employee funds remain largely
unprotected and thus may still face the same tragic losses once again.
Ironically, while the Act imposes enhanced provisions to protect the public,
it fails to adequately address the concerns of the corporate employee as a
future retiree, not simply as an ordinary shareholder in the corporation, and
subsequent legislative activity evidences the fact that Sarbanes-Oxley still
left many concerns unanswered. 4
2. See, e.g., Thomas G. Bost, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Summary, N.C.L.P.J. 2003
WL 1909734, at *1 (April 2003) (remarking that Sarbanes-Oxley was "[slparked by the Enron and
WorldCom debacles and other widely publicized corporate and accounting scandals" and that it "is
intended to establish investor confidence by improving the quality of corporate disclosure and
financial reporting, strengthen the independence of accounting firms, and increase the role and
responsibility of corporate officers and directors in financial statements and corporate disclosures");
Jen Rogers, Fastow and his Wife Plead Guilty: Ex-Enron CFO Agrees to Serve 10 Years, Cooperate
with Authorities: Will Skilling and Lay Be Next?. CNN/MONEY, Jan. 14, 2004, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2004/01/14/news/companies/enron-fastows/index.htm?cnn=yes (last visited
Mar. 1, 2005) (alluding to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, stating "Enron's implosion was among the first
of a string of corporate scandals that ultimately led Congress to pass new laws aimed at stricter
oversight of corporate accounting" because "[t]housands of ... employees lost their jobs and much
of their life savings, and investors lost billions of dollars," from the company's failure).
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) [hereinafter
Sarbanes-Oxley Act] (emphasis added).
4. See S. 1892, 108th Cong. (2003). The Senate has introduced a bill calling for mandatory
disclosure under ERISA where savings plans invest more than fifty percent of plan assets in the
employer's securities.
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Many employers, including those under investigation, use a variety of
stock-based programs, eligible individual account plans (EIAPs)5, such as
typical 401(k)6 pension plans, and employee stock ownership plans
(ESOPs)7 to defer compensation and to theoretically help employees prepare
8for their retirements. The two basic programs differ significantly in regards
to the duties and responsibilities of administrators. Moreover, federal law
deals with any potential violations thereof quite differently.9  Some
programs, such as ESOPs, straddle the definitions and thus the purviews of
both the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §
1001 et seq.,'0 and the Securities Acts of 1933" and 1934.12 Other account
plans, such as traditional pensions aimed at guaranteeing a secure retirement
for those who have spent their lives in a company's service, often also
contain employer stock investments in individual accounts but remain
exclusively within the ambit of ERISA. And still others, such as phantom
stock and certain stock option plans are not even entitled to the protection of
either ERISA or the securities laws. In this regard, the ESOP plaintiffs
alleging fraudulent conduct under federal securities laws will likely obtain
very different results from the other EIAP plaintiffs despite the fact that all
the benefit plans in question essentially involved the same shares of
employer stock simply because ERISA does not comparably address such
losses. Moreover, the pure ERISA plaintiffs cannot expect the provisions of
Sarbanes-Oxley to affect their chances of recovery, as that Act focuses on
the public securities marketplace, which again only accounts for the ESOP
participants.
This Comment will attempt to argue for universal, uniform, enhanced
protections for all EIAP participants investing in employer stock. It will first
describe the major methods of deferred compensation in EIAPs, namely
"traditional" pension plans and employee stock ownership plans,
exemplified and illustrated by several companies currently involved in
multiple litigations regarding securities and ERISA violations.1 3 Next, the
statutes and bases for relief will be presented, focusing on the rights of
recovery for employee investors in the various compensation and pension
5. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 38-56 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative, & "ERISA" Litig., 224 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.
Tex. 2003); In re Duke Energy ERISA Litig., 281 F. Supp. 2d 786, 793 (W.D.N.C. 2003); Vivien v.
WorldCom, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. WL 31640557, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2002).
9. See discussion infra.
10. ERISA regulates all aspects of employer-provided benefit programs, from health and life
insurance to retirement and investment assistance.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77aetseq. (2004).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78a etseq. (2004).
13. See infra notes 21-61 and accompanying text.
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programs in the pending litigations and beyond.' 4 Prior statutory remedies
under securities laws and ERISA have not provided comparable relief to
each of the two main categories of plan participants, with the securities laws
providing the more wide-reaching and accessible theories of recovery for
qualifying programs. Moreover, defendants have argued, sometimes
successfully, for the application of one set of statutory remedies to the
exclusion of the other, where in all likelihood the law should expressly
permit multiple bases for recovery, or at least not unnecessarily limit
plaintiffs' options, in cases where employee investors fall victim to fraud at
the hands of their own companies and their directors.
This Comment will next explain that while commentators have argued
for the application of federal securities laws to certain employee investment
plans such as ESOPs, such imposition would still only provide protection for
a limited number of employee investors, 5 nevertheless frustrating the
purpose of ERISA by excluding a significant percentage of employees from
much-needed enhanced regulations and protections. 16 The common thread
of employer securities utilized in EIAPs will form the basis of the argument
for a more uniform, or at least equalized, system of relief and protection for
all employees, specifically suggesting across-the-board imposition of
provisions similar to the improved securities laws to safeguard against stock
fraud in addition to a more expansive reading of ERISA as suggested in the
Great West 17 dissent so as to promote the true spirit of employee benefit
programs.
This Comment will further demonstrate that the provisions in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which supposedly set forth new guidelines to
avoid future debacles, have presented only a starting point from which to
work towards complete protection for all employee plan participants.1
8
Sarbanes-Oxley predominantly speaks to securities fraud recovery,
providing safeguards against bankrupt fiduciaries and requiring more
comprehensive disclosures. But ERISA remains largely unaltered, leaving
the majority of employer stock account holders with little improvement.
Thus, the Act instead only meets the needs of employee investors half way,
because while ESOP participants and others with standing under the
Securities Acts have gained even more protection,' 9 pure ERISA pension
holders have not made any substantial remedial gains with the Act. Finally,
the conclusion will suggest certain adjustments and predict the likely
14. See infra notes 62-182 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: Employee Stock Options and
Rule lOb-5, 88 IOWA L. REV. 539, 599 (2003) (stating that "employee stock options should be
treated as securities, embedded with the protections against risk of fraud that other shareholders
receive" and arguing for allowing private rights of action to employees under Rule 1Ob-5); Keir N.
Dougall, Note, Augmenting ERISA with Market Discipline: Transforming Pension Plan Interests
into Securities, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 709 (1991) (arguing that pension interests should fall
within the ambit of the Securities Acts).
16. See infra notes 183-255 and accompanying text.
17. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudsen, 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
18. See infra notes 256-317 and accompanying text.
19. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act; Bost, supra note 3.
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outcome and effects of the existing legislation on employee investment plans
and the financial landscape in general. E° The question will remain, however,
as to the extent to which the legislature and the courts are willing to afford
all EIAP investors, regardless of whether opting for ESOP "investments" in
the corporation or traditional pension plans deferring compensation until
retirement from company service, the greater security measures needed to
safeguard their valuable financial, labor, and emotional investments.
II. EMPLOYEES AS INVESTORS IN ELIGIBLE INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT PLANS-
PENSION PLANS, ESOPS, AND OTHER TYPICAL INVESTMENT VEHICLES
A. In General-Definitions and Examples
Section 110721 governs individual employee stock investment, or
Eligible Individual Account Plans ("EIAPs"). An EIAP is defined as "an
individual account plan which is a profit-sharing, stock bonus, thrift or
savings plan; [or] an employee stock ownership plan. 22  EIAPs are
distinguishable from other ERISA savings plans in that, by the terms of the
trust agreement creating the plan, the trustee is allowed to invest a greater
amount of trust assets in employer stock than ERISA normally allows.2 3 In
turn, EIAP investors fall into two main groups, traditional savings or
pension program participants and Employee Stock Ownership Plan
("ESOP") participants, each with differing characteristics and rights.
1. "Traditional" Pension Plans
Pensions and other savings plans play an integral role in the modem
employment landscape, as they serve vital needs for both employees and
employers. Traditional pension plans, often described as "401(k)" plans,2 4
20. See infra notes 318-43 and accompanying text.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1107 (2004).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(3)(A)(i).
23. See Shelby U.S. Distribs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 874, 882 (1979). Ordinarily,
ERISA section 407(a) (codified as 29 U.S.C. 1107(a)) limits the permissible percentage of plan
assets that a trustee may invest in employer securities. However, EIAPs, as defined in section
1107(d)(3)(A) are exempt from the percentage ceiling where the plan documents "explicitly provides
for greater investment in such assets." Shelby, 71 T.C. at 882.
24. 26 U.S.C. § 401(k) (2004). Section 401(k)(2) defines a "qualified cash or deferral
arrangement" as
any arrangement which is part of a profit-sharing or stock bonus plan, a pre-ERISA
money purchase plan, or a rural cooperative plan which meets the requirements of
subsection (a)-
(A) under which a covered employee may elect to have the employer make
payments as contributions to a trust under the plan on behalf of the employee, or to
the employee directly in cash;
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are in essence income deferral programs. 25  The main purpose and
distinguishing factor from ESOPs and other EIAPs or deferred compensation
plans is that traditional pensions ostensibly help employees prepare for
retirement, 26 whereas ESOPs are characterized as investments. Retirement
savings plans allow employees "to invest a portion of their salaries in mutual
funds or in company stock... represent[ing] a tax-deferred plan for
retirement. ' 27  Pensions generally fall into two main categories, defined
benefit and defined contribution programs. 28 Defined benefit plans are less
risky, providing fixed sums of money regardless of plan investment
success. 29  On the other hand, defined-contribution plans, specified in 29
U.S.C. § 1002(34),3° feature investment characteristics, as the participant in
(B) under which amounts held by the trust which are attributable to employer
contributions made pursuant to the employee's election-
(i) may not be distributable to participants or other beneficiaries earlier than-
(I) severance from employment, death, or disability,
(II) an event described in paragraph (10),
(III) in the case of a profit-sharing or stock bonus plan, the attainment of
age 59 1/2, or
(IV) in the case of contributions to a profit-sharing or stock bonus plan
to which section 402(e)(3) applies, upon hardship of the employee, and
(ii) will not be distributable merely by reason of the completion of a stated
period of participation or the lapse of a fixed number of years;
(C) which provides that an employee's right to his accrued benefit derived from
employer contributions made to the trust pursuant to his election is nonforfeitable,
and
(D) which does not require, as a condition of participation in the arrangement, that
an employee complete a period of service with the employer (or employers)
maintaining the plan extending beyond the period permitted under section 410(a)(1)
(determined without regard to subparagraph (B)(i) thereof).
Id.
25. See, e.g., Dougall, supra note 15, at 715 ("Pension plans are financial arrangements under
which employees can defer present income in favor of retirement benefits."); Leslie L. Wellman &
Shari J. Clark, An Overview of Pension Benefit and Fiduciary Litigation Under ERISA, 26
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 665, 667-668 (1990) (defining an "employee pension benefit plan" as "any
plan, fund or program that: 1) 'provides retirement income to employees; or 2) results in a deferral of
income by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond"').
26. See generally Hearings on S. 3598 [ERISAI before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate
Committee on Labor & Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 231 (1972) (statement of SEC Chairman
Manuel Cohen) ("Realistically, the employee is simply putting into a fund for his future use that
which he would otherwise get in his paycheck."); Sean S. Hogle, Note, The Employee as Investor:
The Case for Universal Application of the Federal Securities Laws to Employee Stock Ownership
Plans, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, at 213-14 (1992); Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein,
ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHt. L. REV. 1105, 1111
(1988) (defining a pension plan as a "program of savings during the worker's period of employment,
followed by distribution to the worker and his spouse during their retirement").
27. See ENRON: THE RISE AND FALL, supra note 1, at 289 (describing the Enron retirement plan).
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34)-(35) (2004).
29. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35); SEC Release No. 33-6188, 45 Fed. Reg. 8960, 8963
(Feb. 11, 1980). The SEC Release stipulates that defined-benefit plans specify a particular amount
of money to be paid in installments to retired employees as long as the company is solvent and the
Plan still operates, and requires that sponsoring employers contribute to the plan to compensate for
any discrepancies between plan "investment results" and actual "expectations." Id. Moreover,
defined-benefit plans are safeguarded further by the Pension benefit Guaranty Corporation
("PBGC") which would compensate employees even where their former employer went insolvent.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1322 (2004).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) defines a defined-contribution plan as one "which provides for an
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essence shares in the plan's gains or losses. 3' Defined contribution plans
may be voluntary or mandatory, and contributory or non-contributory.32
Many companies use voluntary defined-contribution plans, and of those
entities, many companies, like Enron, "encouraged employees to invest the[]
funds in [employer] stock, and... [the company] matched employee
contributions with [more employer] stock., 33  Unfortunately, pension
programs leveraged with employer stock generally will not withstand a
corporate crisis, 34 and certainly not when coupled with a scheduled
"lockdown" of assets, which occur from time to time in order to change plan
administrators or conduct other ministerial matters.35 But in the end, a
"traditional" plan still falls within the ambit of EIAPs and are thus exempt
from the traditional protections of ERISA where the plan invests in
employer stock.
36
2. ESOPs
Section 1107 also defines an Employee Stock Ownership Plan
("ESOP") as an individual account plan
(A) which is a stock bonus plan which is qualified, or a stock bonus
plan and money purchase plan both of which are qualified, under
section 401 of Title 26, and which is designed to invest primarily in
qualifying employer securities, and
(B) which meets such other requirements as the Secretary of the
Treasury may prescribe by regulation.37
individual account for each participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to
the participant's account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeitures of
accounts of other participants which may be allocated to such participant's account." Id.
31. See SEC Release No. 33-6188, at 8963 ("[D]efined contribution plans maintain individual
accounts for all participating employees... [which] reflect each participant's share in the underlying
trust assets and are adjusted annually to take into account plan contributions, earnings, and
forfeitures.").
32. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. See Part V-E infra for discussion of the effect of "lockdowns."
36. See Wright v. Or. Metallurgical Corp., 360 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing the
different types of plans within the EIAP definition and distinguishing other ERISA plans).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6) (2004) (emphasis added). See Penn. Fed'n, Bhd. of Maint. of Way
Employees v. Norfolk S. Corp. Thoroughbred Ret. Inv. Plan, No. 02-9049, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1987, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2004) (explaining EIAPs in general and in relation to the specific plan
in that case). The Internal Revenue Code of 1986, section 4975(e)(7) alternatively classifies an
ESOP as a defined contribution program "designed to invest primarily in qualifying employer
securities." I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7)(A) & 29 U.S.C. § 1 107(d)(6).
An ESOP basically provides a "tax-qualified, employee benefit plan
designed to enable employees to acquire stock ownership interests in their
employers. 38  An ESOP thus basically constitutes shareholding in the
employee's company, made available to those otherwise unable to afford
such investment. 39  ESOPs therefore differ from regular pension plans
because they specifically promote employee investment in the employer's
securities instead of mere deferral of compensation until retirement.40 An
ESOP does not necessarily provide a secure retirement fund but rather
allows employees to become a part of the ownership of the company.4'
Congress specifically intended to encourage employees to take part in their
corporations by owning employer stock.42 It is in fact unclear why Congress
decided that ERISA should govern ESOPs, "3 as aspects of such plans mirror
investments more closely than retirement funds."4
But ESOPs, as an EIAP,45 indeed still fall within the purview of ERISA
and therefore differ from other employer stock ownership interests such as
traditional stock options 46 and so-called "phantom stock" compensation,47
which are not governed by ERISA.48 In this regard, ESOPs still constitute
areas of federal regulation and concern, especially because the programs
resemble traditional deferred compensation plans, albeit including an extra
38. Hogle, supra note 26, at 208 (arguing that ESOPs should be regulated and controlled by the
1933 and 1934 Securities Acts because of the stock and investment characteristics of the typical
ESOP); see Hunter C. Blum, Comment, ESOP's Fables: Leveraged ESOPs and Their Effect on
Managerial Slack, Employee Risk, and Motivation in the Public Corporation, 31 U. RICH. L. REv.
1539, 1542-43 (1997). The author states that "[piroperly understood, an ESOP is simply a vehicle
though which an employer sells stock to employees." Id. at 214.
39. See Blum, supra note 38, at 1542-44 (describing the legal history of the ESOP concept);
Hogle, supra note 26, at 213-14 (describing an ESOP as "simply a tax-preferred means by which
companies sell stock to employees in order to raise capital" and disapproving the tax code reference
to an ESOP as a "pension plan").
40. See Blum, supra note 38, at 1543 (defining an ESOP as "deferred compensation" but with its
"primary objective to provide stock ownership interests to its employees" due to its nature "as a
stock bonus plan designed to invest primarily in employer stock") (emphasis added); Hogle, supra
note 26, at 210-12.
41. See Hogle, supra note 26, at 211-12 (explaining that the "utility of an ESOP in providing for
retirement is very limited" and that Congress did not intend to "provide a new, unnecessary, and
inadequate source of employee savings" in promoting ESOPs through tax breaks, instead merely
attempting to "broaden the base of capital ownership"); see also Blum, supra note 38, at 1549
(explaining that ESOPs essentially amount to a trade of the privilege of employer stock ownership
for employee risk by lesser income and other benefits).
42. See S. REP. No. 94-36, at 56 (1975); Kuper v. lovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1459 (6th Cir. 1995).
43. See Hogle, supra note 26, at 212 & n.131 (citing Employee Ownership on Hostile Takeovers:
Hearings on S.1323 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1987) (statement of former Sen. Long)). Many commentators cite the standing of
sponsoring Senator Long as Finance Committee Chair as the reason for the seemingly
counterintuitive categorization of the provision within the tax code. Id.
44. Congress promulgated ERISA to ensure "fairer and more effective [pension plans] in
providing retirement income for employees ... " H.R. REP. No. 93-807, at 1 (1974).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 1107.
46. Bodie, supra note 15, at 549-50.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 549-50 (differentiating between the various stock ownership interests and
distinguishing between the ERISA-regulated ESOPs and 401(k) plans as opposed to stock options or
"stock bought on the open market").
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element of risk. And Congress has certainly allowed ESOP administrators
and other fiduciaries more room to maneuver, eliminating the duty to
diversify plan investments imposed on traditional pension fiduciaries as well
as the ban on self-dealings. 49  "[A]n ESOP fiduciary is often in a unique
position of being required to administer an ESOP plan in such a fashion as to
comply with the strict standards of fiduciary responsibility imposed by
ERISA and yet satisfy the demands of Congressional policies affording
ESOPs favorable treatment."50 Thus, the regulation of ESOPs first serves to
encourage employee investment in employer securities.5 1 But the sticking-
point appears, however, where the lines between the profit-sharing interests
of employee as investor blur with the secure deferred compensation
concerns of employee as future retiree. Thus, ESOPs must also work to
protect investors like pension plan participants, and, therefore, the ERISA
fiduciary duty to diversify likely still applies in a limited sense.
5 2
Because ESOPs are subject to two competing policies, courts must
adequately account for each concern in determining fiduciary duty in cases
alleging improper fiduciary conduct and decision-making. Accordingly,
courts have narrowly construed the exception to the general exemption for
ESOP fiduciaries from the duty to diversify, finding a breach of fiduciary
duty only where continuing to invest in employer stock clearly constituted
an abuse of discretion.53 Armed with the presumption of prudence,
therefore, ESOP fiduciaries have a fairly formidable shield to liability for
49. See In re Duke Energy ERISA Litig., 281 F. Supp. 2d 786, 793 (W.D.N.C. 2003) (citing
Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1458 (6th Cir. 1995) to illustrate Congress's intent to promote
ESOPs and employee stock ownership by softening the conventional fiduciary requirements of
ERISA).
50. Duke Energy, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 793.
51. See Kuper, 66 F.3d at 1459; Stein v. Smith, 270 F. Supp. 2d 157, 172 (D. Mass 2003). The
court in Stein stated that
[b]ecause the very purpose of an ESOP is to promote employee stock ownership, holding
ESOP fiduciaries to the same duty as fiduciaries of other kinds of pension plans to
diversify investments in order to reduce the risk of large losses would "risk transforming
ESOP's into ordinary pension plans, thus frustrating [Congressional intent] ... and
contravening the intent of the parties."
Stein, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 172.
52. See id. (holding that Kuper and Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 571 (3d Cir. 1995), both
consider the protection of employee investors in determining the appropriate application of the duty
to diversify).
53. See Duke Energy, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 794 (following Moench, 62 F.3d at 571, and holding
that ESOP fiduciaries are entitled to presumption that their "decision to remain invested in employer
stock is a reasonable one"); Wright v. Or. Metallurgical Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1233-34 (D.
Or. 2002) (maintaining that breach of fiduciary duty in the ESOP context is merely a "narrow
exception to the general rule" and that only an "unusual circumstanc[e]" such as "impending
collapse" would warrant disregarding the statutory exception in favor of imposing the duty to
diversify); see also Hill v. BellSouth Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1367 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (discussing
the defendant corporation's argument that the presumption of prudence should apply despite the fact
that the circuit had yet to recognize the presumption).
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breach of fiduciary duty, only facing sanctions where engaging in clearly
egregious conduct.14  Moreover, as illustrated in Duke Energy ERISA
Litigation, courts apply a "substantial likelihood" test in determining
whether a misrepresentation is "material" so as to constitute a breach of
fiduciary duty.55 As the court in Duke Energy noted, such test for
materiality "mirrors that used by the courts in analyzing securities fraud
cases" 56 and does not provide any substantial independent protection to the
interests of ESOP participants apart from what is already required by
securities laws. 7
3. "Phantom Stock" and Stock Option Bonus Plans
Finally, a phantom stock plan is a "long-term benefit plan under which a
corporate employee is given units having the same characteristics as the
employer's stock shares. The employee does not actually hold any shares
but instead holds the right to the value of those shares. 58 In this regard, as
the employee does not actually hold the employer securities, the law does
not recognize any causes of action under securities laws. 59  ERISA also
precludes coverage of phantom stock because unlike traditional savings
plans, phantom stock and other "bonuses" serve as compensation as "an
incentive or a reward for good work."6 Thus, while phantom stock and
other deferred compensation programs may not fulfill ERISA retirement
goals, such plans nonetheless play an important role in employee
54. See Kuper, 66 F.3d at 1460; Moench, 62 F.3d at 571 (requiring knowledge of "impending
collapse" in order to necessitate proper disclosure); Duke Energy, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 793 (same);
Wright, 222 F. Supp. 2d at 1233-34.
55. Duke Energy, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 791 (citing James v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 305 F.3d
439, 449 (6th Cir. 2002), Griggs v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 237 F.3d 371, 380 (4th Cir.
2001), Mullins v. Pfizer, Inc., 23 F.3d 663, 669 (2d Cir. 1994), and Bunnion v. Consol. Rail Corp.,
108 F. Supp. 2d 403, 415 (E.D. Pa. 1999)). Courts find materiality where "there [is] a substantial
likelihood that [the misrepresentation] would have misled a reasonable participant in making an
adequately informed decision about whether to place or maintain monies in" the fund in question. In
re Unisys Say. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 442 (3d Cir. 1996).
56. Duke Energy, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 791.
57. Id.
58. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). The court in Whitt v. Sherman
Int'l Corp., 147 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 1998) defines the interest as the "'right... to receive an
award with a value equal to the appreciation of a share of stock from the date the Phantom Stock is
cashed out... [and] are based on "phantom" or "hypothetical" shares or units."' Id. (quoting
Coopers & Lybrand, Executive Summary of Nonqualified Longterm Incentive Plans, CVO1 ALI-
ABA 619, 632 (1996)).
59. See Bodie, supra note 15, at 549-50. The author characterizes the stock options and phantom
stock plans as "bonus plans" and posits that "[flederal courts have overwhelmingly found that bonus
plans ... are not pension plans ... [because they] provid[e] current rather than retirement income."
Id. at 597-98 (citing the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Murphy v. Inexco Oil Co., 611 F.2d 570, 576
(5th Cir. 1980). See also Wellman & Clark, supra note 25, at 667-68 (confirming that bonus
programs are not part of the ERISA framework).
60. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative, & "ERISA" Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 530-31 n.2 (S.D.
Tex. 2003) (citing Absher v. Flexi Int'l Software, Inc., No. Civ. 3:02CV171 (AHN), 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6089, at *6 (D. Conn. Apr. 10, 2003)). Phantom stock can, in very limited circumstances,
fall within ERISA if its purpose is clearly "to provide retirement income." See Murphy, 611 F.2d at
575.
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compensation packages, as they provide similar benefits to ESOPs and other
stock ownership interests without actual ownership.6' Unfortunately, given
the gap between the statutes, employers may find that using such open forms
of compensation shields from liability otherwise imposed under the
securities laws or ERISA provisions.
III. RELEVANT STATUTES AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
Thus, employees participating in ESOPs likely fall within the ambit of
the securities laws and can benefit from the protections the Securities Acts
provide. However, pension and savings plans likely do not qualify as
"securities" for purposes of the Acts, therefore leaving the individuals
claiming damages to their pension plans without remedies under securities
laws. Accordingly, pension plan participants can pursue remedies merely
under the ERISA statutory scheme, which sometimes even then does not
adequately protect and compensate for their losses.
A. The 1933 Securities Act & the 1934 Securities Exchange Act
1. In General
Congress enacted two securities acts in 1933 and 1934 in reaction to the
stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression.62 The Acts
mainly serve to "protect investors in the public marketplace by attaching
consequences to the making, by registered companies, of inaccurate or
misleading statements. ' 63 However, securities laws play a vital role in the
employee deferred compensation context, as employer securities often
comprise the bulk or the totality of plan investments.64 And as the world
saw in the past couple of years, alleged securities laws violations can
61. In re Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 531.
62. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 11 (1933); J. Robert Brown, Corporate Communications
and the Federal Securities Laws, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 741, 742 & n.2 (1985).
63. Stein v. Smith, 270 F. Supp. 2d 157, 166 (D. Mass. 2003); see also S. REP. No. 73-47, at 1
(1933) (positing that the "basic policy [of the 1933 Securities Act] is that of informing the investor
of the facts concerning securities to be offered for sale ... to prevent further exploitation of the
public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepresentation; to
place adequate and true information before the investor").
64. All qualified "securities" buyers, which likely include ESOP participants and arguably
include other purchasers of employer securities, fall within the protection of the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See generally Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56,
61 n.l (1990) (finding that the definition of "security" is essentially parallel between the two Acts,
encompassing the basic interpretations set forth in 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(l) & 78c(a)(10)). See also 15
U.S.C. §§ 77b(l) & 78c(a)(10) (2000).
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devastate employee deferred compensation accounts along with ordinary
public investors.65
a. The 1933 Securities Act: The Regulatory Registration Provisions
i. In General
The 1933 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq., controls the content of
securities registration statements, documents required by the Securities and
Exchange Commission as part of the trade and dealing of stock, and
provides express remedies for registration violations and other misconduct in
the offer to sell securities. 66 "The Securities Act of 1933 ... was designed to
provide investors with full disclosure of material information concerning
public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors against fraud
and, through the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote ethical
standards of honesty and fair dealing. '67  Generally, publicly-traded
corporate entities are required to adhere to certain universal rules for the
reporting of its financial status. Standards such as Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles ("GAAP") provide uniform methods of measuring
financial health to normalize record-keeping between companies and thus to
help guide investors in their investment decisions. 68 However, the civil
liability under the Securities Act for filing false or misleading registration
statements serves mainly to encourage compliance with the Act and prevent
negligent conduct in general, rather than necessarily providing compensation
to any injured acquirers of a security. 69
Under the 1933 Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission mandates
that companies file Forms 10-K and Registration Statements as signed
evidence of the entity's finances before offering a security. 70 The SEC
filings purportedly afford investors some level of security and assurance by
furnishing governmental regulation and penalties for non-compliance.7' In
particular, the 1933 Act specifically imposes civil liability for filing false
65. See, e.g., In re Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 511; In re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litig., 263 F.
Supp. 2d 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
66. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.
67. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
68. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has officially defined and codified the use of "generally accepted"
accounting methods for securities law purposes under 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b), which will be more
thoroughly detailed upon the completion of the study ordered in Sarbanes-Oxley § 108(d).
69. Globus v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
71. See § 77k (setting forth civil penalties for failure to register accurate statements). See
generally § 77 ("1933 Act") & § 78 ("1934 Act"). "SEC filings are the quintessential statement on
which a reasonable investor may rely and thus are the type of statement that can give rise to...
action[s] against a defendant who signed them." In re WorldCom, Inc. Secs. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d
392, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing In re Ames Dept. Stores, 991 F.2d 968, 972 (2d Cir. 1993));
Thomson Kernaghan & Co. v. Global Intellicom, Inc., Nos. 99 Civ. 3005 & 99 Civ. 3015 (DLC),
2000 WL 640653, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2000); and In re JWP Sec. Litig., 928 F. Supp. 1239,
1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
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registration statements in the initial offering of a particular security.72
Particularly applicable to the employee investor context, the SEC
specifically requires employers to file Forms S-8, 73 which mirror the Forms
10-K disclosure requirements for publicly traded securities under the 1934
Act.
74
In theory, the ultimate responsibility under the 1933 Act lies internally
with the company and its committees and directors, who are often the same
individuals and entities acting as EIAP fiduciaries under ERISA. In
particular, "[a]udit committees play a critical role in monitoring corporate
management and a corporation's auditor., 75 By supervising and regulating
SEC filings, the committees supposedly serve to catch and correct any errors
or otherwise face liability.
ii. Recovery Under the 1933 Act
The 1933 Act expressly permits claims brought by anyone who
"acquires" a security bearing a false or misleading registration statement
against any person who signed the statement: issuing directors and partners,
professional experts who certify the statement or whose assessments are
used in the statement, and the security underwriters.76 Specifically, the code
regulates the statements by prohibiting the making of an "untrue statement
of a material fact," an omission of a material fact required to be disclosed, or
an omission of a material fact "necessary to make the [included]
statements... not misleading., 77 Congress intended to "assure compliance
with the disclosure provisions of the [Securities] Act by imposing a stringent
standard of liability on the parties who play a direct role in a registered
72. 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
73. See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS, SECURITIES ACT RELEASE No. 6281, FED. SEC. L. REP.
P1052 (Jan. 15, 1981); REGISTRATION AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
PLANS, SECURITIES ACT RELEASE No. 6867, FED. SEC. L. REP. P84605 (June 6, 1990).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g).
75. In re WorldCom, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 403; see also discussion infra regarding similar
provisions under the 1934 Act. The court in WorldCom enumerated typical audit committee
responsibilities set forth in a New York Stock Exchange Blue Ribbon Committee report, including
"'ensuring that quality accounting policies, internal controls, and independent and objective auditors
are in place to deter fraud, anticipat[ing] financial risks and promot[ing] accurate, high quality and
timely disclosure of financial and other material information."' Id. at 403 n.8.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). "Section 11" as it is called
provides that any signer, director of the issuer, preparing or certifying accountant, or
underwriter may be liable if "any part of the registration statement, when such part
became effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading ...."
In re WorldCom, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 407 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)).
77. Id.
offering., 78 Section 11 imposes strict liability for misleading representations
regarding the viability of the investment in the company, prohibiting
statements that "'taken together and in context, would have [misled] a
reasonable investor' about the nature of the investment. '79  The purchaser
then may sue for rescission or damages.8"
Section 12 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §.771, also provides a remedy to
investors for false communications regarding the propriety of investment in
a company's securities. 8 The Code states in relevant part that an investor
has a private right of action against a seller or solicitor who "offers or sells a
security.., by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which
includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements ... not misleading. 82 Both
sellers and solicitors can face liability, with underwriters included as
"sellers" for purposes of section 12 causes of action.83 Thus, the 1933 Act
provides a number of strict liability84  causes of action for any
misrepresentations included in an initial registration statement of public
securities.
b. The 1934 Securities Exchange Act: The Anti-Fraud Provisions for
Holding Claims
Alternatively, the 1934 Securities Exchange Act provides a separate
cause of action for defrauded securities buyers,85 designating private rights
of action for investors who fall victim to price and market manipulation and
other related conduct8 6 similar to the activities at Enron and WorldCom.
78. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1983).
79. I. Meyer Pincus & Assocs., P.C. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 936 F.2d 759, 761 (2d Cir. 1991)
(quoting McMahon & Co. v. Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc. 900 F.2d 576, 579 (2d Cir. 1990)).
Facts relevant to an informed investment decision are considered "material" for purposes of stating a
section 11 cause of action, namely those pieces of information regarding the likely future of the
company and other factors that may induce purchase, sale, or holding the particular corporate
security. See Kronfeld v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 832 F.2d 726, 732 (2d Cir. 1987).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (stating that the injured party may "recover the consideration paid for
such security with interest. .. less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of
such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security"); see also Commercial Union
Assurance Co. v. Milken, 17 F.3d 608, 615 (2d Cir. 1994).
81. 15. U.S.C. § 771.
82. Id. § 771(a)(2).
83. See In re WorldCom Inc., Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 392, 408-09 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also
Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 642-47 (1988). Pinter imposes liability on immediate, not remote,
sellers who "pass[] title, or otherinterest in the security, to the buyer for value" (Pinter, 486 U.S. at
644 n.21) as well as persons who "successfully solicit[] the purchase, motivated at least in part by a
desire to serve [their] own financial interests or those of the securities owner." Id. at 647.
84. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 1(a)(2), 78j(b); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 582 (1995)
(holding that 15 U.S.C. § 771 does not require "proof of either fraud or reliance"); Shaw v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996); see also Stein v. Smith, 270 F. Supp. 2d 157, 167 (D.
Mass. 2003).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
86. See id. §§ 78i-j. See also id. § 78j(b); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983). In fact,
section 10(b) provides the lone cause of action for pure fraud under the Securities Act. Beecher v.
Able, 435 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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The 1934 Act serves to "substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business
ethics in the securities industry."87 United States Code title 15, section 78(i),
also known as Section 9 of the Securities Exchange Act,88 prohibits the
manipulation of security prices in relation to the purchase or sale of
registered securities.89 The Code provides that in
[t]ransactions relating to [the] purchase or sale of [a] security[, i]t
shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange, or for any
member of a national securities exchange... for the purpose of
creating a false or misleading appearance of active trading in any
security registered on a national securities exchange, or a false or
misleading appearance with respect to the market for any such
security... [or] to make, regarding any security registered on a
national securities exchange, for the purpose of inducing the
purchase or sale of such security any statement which was at the
time and in the light of the circumstances under which it was made,
false or misleading with respect to any material fact, and which he
knew or had reasonable ground to believe was so false or
misleading.90
Section 9 clearly approves personal liability for such violations, holding that
[a]ny person who willfully participates in any act or transaction in
violation of ... this section, shall be liable to any person who shall
purchase or sell any security at a price which was affected by such
act or transaction, and the person so injured may sue ... to recover
the damages sustained as a result of any such act or transaction.91
Furthermore, under 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), also known as "Rule 10(b),"
fraudulent misrepresentations associated with the purchase or sale of
securities constitute actionable conduct and generate a private right of action
for the defrauded investors.92 Rule 10(b) prohibits the use of "manipulative
and deceptive devices" "in connection with the purchase or sale of [the]
security." 93  The Code of Federal Regulations Rule lOb-5 provides the
87. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2004).
89. Id.
90. § 78i(a)(1)-(4).
91. § 78i(e).
92. Id. § 78j(b).
93. Id. The Code reads:
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accompanying legal standard.94 Individuals and entities face Rule 10(b) and
lOb-5 liability where they "obtain[] (a) material, (b) nonpublic information
intended to be used solely for a proper purpose and then (c) misappropriates
or otherwise misuses that information (d) with scienter,95 (e) in breach of a
fiduciary duty, other duty arising out of a relationship of trust and
confidence, to make 'secret profits."'' 96  Rule 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 thus
require that the plaintiff show that the defendant acted with scienter 97 in
misrepresenting and misusing the financial information to his own benefit.9
8
Furthermore, plaintiffs are not limited to one statutory remedy within the
1934 Act and may sue under multiple sections.99 Thus in essence, Rule
10(b) "protect[s] investors by serving as a 'catchall provision' which creates
a cause of action for manipulative practices by defendants acting in bad
faith." °
Furthermore, directors and officers who sign faulty registration
statements and annual reports are still liable under the 1934 Act for any
errors even without actually taking part in the preparation of the
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange... [tlo use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, ....
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
94. See 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (2004). Rule lOb-5 requires that a plaintiff prove (1) either a false
statement of material fact or an omission of a material fact under circumstances warranting a duty to
disclose, (2) scienter, (3) reasonable reliance upon the misrepresentations or omissions, and (4)
proximate cause. Copansky v. Thompson, 58 F. Supp. 2d 682, 684-85 (E.D. Va. 1999) (citing
Cooke v. Manufactured Homes, Inc., 998 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 (4th Cir. 1993)).
95. "Scienter is 'a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."' SEC v.
Infinity Group Co., 212 F.3d 180, 192 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 193 n. 12 (1976)). Scienter
includes recklessness ... [which encompasses] "highly unreasonable (conduct),
involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure
from the standards of ordinary care[] ... which presents a danger of misleading buyers or
sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been
aware of it.
Id. (citations omitted).
96. SEC v. HealthSouth Corp., 261 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1319 n.42 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (citing Dirks
v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983)); SEC v. Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d 295, 308 (2d Cir.
1999); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981)).
97. "Scienter" entails showing that the "[d]efendants acted recklessly or with the intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Copansky, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 685.
98. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654.
99. Wolgin v. Magic Marker Corp., 82 F.R.D. 168, 172 (E.D. Pa. 1979). Many sections may
apply to particular relevant conduct by the defendants, and the Securities Acts were not intended to
constrain plaintiffs' avenues for relief. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 60-61 (8th Cir.
1990) ("Congress painted with a broad brush... [and] did not attempt... to cabin the scope of the
Securities Acts.").
100. In re WorldCom, Inc. Secs. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 392,410 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976)).
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statement. '' The SEC posits that "by signing documents filed with the
Commission, board members implicitly indicate that they believe that the
filing is accurate and complete."102  Similarly, the 1934 Act also imposes
liability against "control persons" of entities or other individuals committing
securities violations.'0 3 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a), also known as "Section 20,"
mandates that
[e]very person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable
under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation
thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the
same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such
controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in
good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts
constituting the violation or cause of action.'°4
Therefore, the Securities Acts ostensibly provide a broad set of statutory
remedies and regulations governing securities investments, especially in the
cases of alleged fraud and other evident corporate misconduct. 105
B. ERISA of 1974
On the other hand, most employee interests in employer securities do
not fall within the ambit of the Securities Acts and are instead controlled by
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.
1. In General
ERISA is a "'comprehensive and reticulated statute,' the product of a
decade of congressional study of the Nation's private employee benefit
101. See Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2000). The court asserted
that
[Pilacing responsibility on corporate officers... ensure[s] the validity of corporate
filings... [and protects] investors.., from misleading information... Key corporate
officers should not be allowed to make important false financial statements knowingly or
recklessly, yet still shield themselves from liability to investors simply by failing to be
involved in the preparation of those statements. Otherwise, the securities laws would be
significantly weakened.
Id.
102. S.E.C. Release No. 41987 ("Audit Committee Disclosure"), 1999 WL 955908, at *9 (Oct. 7,
1999); see also supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing audit committee responsibilities
under both Acts).
103. See S.E.C. Release, 1999 WL 955908, at *18-19 (referring to 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2004).
105. The Securities Acts are further supplemented by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. See infra
Part V.
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system.' '10 6  As noted, ERISA generally governs pension plans and other
employer provisions for savings and retirement.'i 7 Congress enacted ERISA
for the express purpose of ensuring "fairer and more effective [pension
plans] in providing retirement income for employees.. ,,"'0 whereas the
Securities Acts were intended to protect investors from fraud and other
misconduct with relation, to the public trading of corporate securities.'0 9
ERISA only controls employee welfare benefit and pension benefit plans or
some combination thereof." 0
ERISA's provisions sound in the common law of trusts,"' creating
fiduciary status and resultant duties on those acting in a fiduciary capacity."'
Fiduciary status is conferred either where the entity takes on the "functional"
fiduciary obligations as set forth in section 1002(21) or where the ERISA
plan expressly names an entity as a fiduciary." 3 The Code first bestows
functional fiduciary status on persons and entities
with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary
authority or discretionary control respecting management of such
plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or
disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee
or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any
moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or
responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or
discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan. 114
106. Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993) (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)).
107. See ERISA of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 1001, 88 Stat. 829-1035.
108. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, at 1 (1974).
109. See supra notes 66 & 86 and accompanying text.
110. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)-(3) (2004); In re Enron Corp. Secs., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F.
Supp. 2d 511, 530 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 2003). In this regard, bonus programs and "phantom stock"
compensation do not constitute retirement or welfare benefits governed by ERISA. Wellman &
Clark, supra note 25, at 667-68.
111. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2004) ("[AIII assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in
trust."); see also § 1104 (enumerating the fiduciary duties); Gina Marie Agresta-Richardson,
Comment, Employee Stock Ownership Plans: Uncertainties Plaguing the Duties of the ESOP
Fiduciary with Respect to Voting and Defensive ESOPs, 14 AKRON TAX J. 91, 100-01 (1999)
("Section 404 evidences Congress's intent to adopt traditional notions of trust law to monitor
fiduciary conduct ....").
112. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1103-04 (2004).
113. In re Elec. Data Sys. Corp. ERISA Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d 658, 665 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (citing
In re Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 543 and distinguishing between the creation of fiduciary status
through a "functional" method specified by certain conduct or through "express designation by the
ERISA plan documents").
114. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2004). "[T]he definition of who is a fiduciary... is based on the
person's functions, not the title conferred by the Plan." Kayes v. Pac. Lumber Co., 51 F.3d 1449,
1460 (9th Cir. 1995). ERISA does not, however, impose fiduciary liability for decision-making as to
the basic structure of a plan. See Akers v. Palmer, 71 F.3d 226, 230 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that
"only actions respecting the administration or management of plan 'assets' are subject to fiduciary
standards" (emphasis in original)).
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Accordingly, "discretion [is] a sine qua non of fiduciary duty.""'  In
addition, section 1102(a)(2) also specifies that ERISA plans may designate
fiduciaries, called "named fiduciaries."" 6Thus, fiduciaries are subject to
many of the same duties as imposed in trust law,'1 7 and ERISA, like the
Securities Acts, also provides for co-fiduciary liability in certain
circumstances. "18
Fiduciary relationships, specific responsibilities, and directive authority
under ERISA, including those created by functional fiduciary status, are
generally set forth in the plan documents." 9  For example, Enron
Corporation itself was a named fiduciary to the Enron Savings Plan, charged
with the duty to appoint committee members to be Plan Administrator and
the duty to generally administer the Plan except for investment of assets in
the trust fund. 20  The plan documents stated that "Enron must provide the
Administrative Committee with 'any information that the Committee
determines is necessary for the proper administration of the Plan' and to the
Trustee any such 'facts as are deemed necessary for the Trustee to carry out
the Trustee's duties under the Plan. ' 2'1 The Savings Plan agreement also
held that "Enron has sole discretion in appointing, removing and replacing
the Trustee. [Thus,] Enron, although a Plan sponsor, is also a fiduciary to
the Plan to the extent it exercises discretionary control and authority over
115. Cottrill v. Sparrow, Johnson & Ursillo, Inc., 74 F.3d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Pohl v.
Nat'l Benefits Consultants, Inc., 956 F.2d 126, 129 (7th Cir. 1992)).
116. Section 1 102(a)(2) states that fiduciary status is bestowed upon:
a fiduciary who is named in the plan instrument, or who, pursuant to a procedure
specified in the plan, is identified as a fiduciary (A) by a person who is an employer or
employee organization with respect to the plan or (B) by such an employer and such an
employee organization acting jointly.
Id.
117. See infra Part III-B-2-a for enumeration and explanation of fiduciary duties under ERISA.
118. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (2004). A fiduciary may be held liable for the conduct of another
fiduciary
(1) if he participates knowingly in, or knowingly undertakes to conceal, an act or
omission of such other fiduciary, knowing such act or omission is a breach;
(2) if, by his failure to comply with section [1 104(a)(1) of this title] in the administration
of his specific responsibilities which give rise to his status as a fiduciary, he has enabled
such other fiduciary to commit a breach; or
(3) if he has knowledge of a breach by such other fiduciary, unless he makes reasonable
efforts under the circumstances to remedy the breach.
Id.
119. "[In reviewing the fiduciary's actions, the court must be governed by the intent behind the
trust" and whether "adherence to the [Plan's] direction" is consistent with how the sponsor or settlor
expect a prudent trustee to act. Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 571 (3d Cir. 1995) (emphasis
added).
120. In re Enron Corp. Secs., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 653 (S.D. Tex.
2003).
121. Id.
these specific matters."' 22  Alternatively, the Enron ESOP bestows the
"power to appoint, remove, and replace the trustee" on the Enron Board of
Directors.123  The Trustee then must "act on the [Administrative]
Committee's directions" after the Committee determines "the extent to
which the Trust Fund shall be invested in Company Stock and... the price
at which Company Stock will be purchased or sold." 124 Thus, the fiduciary
relationships and consequent responsibilities take on a contractual nature to
a great degree1 25 and turn upon the facts of each case, 126 in many cases
leaving the plaintiffs without recourse against the individuals truly
responsible for any plan losses.
2. Remedial Provisions Under ERISA
ERISA expressly permits a plan participant to sue an ERISA plan.
127
United States Code Title 29, section 1132(a)(1)(A)-(B) provides that a
participant or beneficiary may sue individually "for the relief provided for in
subsection (c) of this section, or ... to recover benefits due to him under the
terms of his plkn, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to
clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan."' 128 Section
1132(a)(2) allows suit against fiduciaries for breaches of their duties
enumerated in section 1109,129 and the Secretary of Labor, participants,
beneficiaries, and fiduciaries have standing to bring suit for such relief. 30 A
participant, beneficiary or fiduciary may also sue "to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of the plan,
or... to obtain other appropriate equitable relief... to redress such
violations or... to enforce any provisions of this title or the terms of the
plan."'' Furthermore, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) does not
preclude suit by plan participants and beneficiaries, because the employees,
as beneficial owners, may "su[e] or join[] with the legal title holder if the
122. Id.
123. Id. atn.142.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Beddall v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1998)
(demonstrating the importance of the trust agreement in determining fiduciary relations and
responsibilities).
126. Compare In re WorldCom, Inc., ERISA Litig., 263 F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(involving documents which enabled fiduciaries to eliminate investments in employer securities in
the WorldCom 401(k) plans), with Crowley v. Coming, Inc., No. 02-CV-6172 CJS, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 758, at *16-23 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2004) (distinguishing the facts of WorldCom from the
Coming Inc. Plan documents which required fiduciaries to maintain Coming stock as an investment
option); see also In re CMS Energy ERISA Litig., 312 F. Supp. 2d 898, 907-909 (E.D. Mich. 2004)
(comparing and contrasting the circumstances of the case with In Re McKesson HBOC, Inc., ERISA
Litig., No. COO-20030RMW, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19473 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2002) and Rankin
v. Rots, 278 F. Supp. 2d 853 (E.D. Mich. 2003)).
127. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2004); see also In re Enron Corp. Secs., Derivative & ERISA Litig.,
284 F. Supp. 2d at 511.
128. 29 U.S.C. § 1 132(a)(1). See Wellman & Clark, supra note 25, at 685-86.
129. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). See Wellman & Clark, supra note 25, at 685-86.
130. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).
131. 29U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
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beneficial owner has the right sought to be enforced."'' 32 Therefore, even
though the savings plans or ESOPs actually hold the investments, employees
and other beneficiaries may still sue them because the employee participants
and beneficiaries have the right to collect under and enforce the terms of the
plan.
Section 1109, also known as ERISA section 409, expressly provides the
basis for fiduciary liability in cases of breach, such as fraud. Specifically,
section 1109 states that:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches
any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon
fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally liable to make
good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such
breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary
which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the
fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial
relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such
fiduciary. '33
Additionally, section 1132(a)(2), or ERISA section 502(a)(2), expressly
provides the cause of action. 134 Thus, the plan may sue fiduciaries in breach
of their duties to "make good" the losses suffered by the plan. In addition,
section 1132(a)(3) authorizes individual participants to sue individually
instead of on the plan's behalf.' 35 However, individual persons suing ERISA
fiduciaries may seek limited relief. 36  And finally, courts have denied any
extra-contractual relief 33 or punitive damages 13 in causes of action broughtunder the ERISA framework.
132. Beasoechea v. Sverdrup & Parcel & Assoc., 486 F. Supp. 169, 173 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
133. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2004).
134. § 1132(a)(2) ("A civil action may be brought... by the Secretary, or by a participant,
beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 1109 of this title.").
135. § 1132(a)(3); see Steinman v. Hicks, 352 F.3d 1101, 1102-03 (7th Cir. 2003) (distinguishing
between the different ERISA relief provisions and enumerating other supporting authority).
136. See infra Part IV-B-I-b for discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretation in Great-West
Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002).
137. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (holding that ERISA does not
expressly or impliedly authorize extra-contractual damages).
138. Id. The common law of trusts also prohibits punitive damages; thus, courts have followed
both the Russell decision as well as the principles in trust law to find that ERISA does not allow the
award of punitive damages. See, e.g., Kleinhans v. Lisle Sav. Profit Sharing Trust, 810 F.2d 618,
627 (7th Cir. 1987).
a. Fiduciary Duties Under Section 1104
In general, ERISA fiduciaries must abide by certain statutory duties and
accordingly face civil liability for breaching those duties to the plan
participants and beneficiaries.3 9 ERISA fiduciaries must 1) "act solely in
the interests of the [Plan] participants and beneficiaries," 2) "act according
to the terms of the plan," 3) administer the plan according to the prudent
man standard of conduct, and 4) diversify the plan's investments so as to
avoid unnecessary losses.'4° A fiduciary who has breached his duties to a
plan "may be personally liable for the Plan's losses resulting from the breach
[of fiduciary duty] and subject to any other equitable or remedial relief a
court may deem appropriate."
'14
1
An ERISA fiduciary must adhere to the common-law fiduciary duty of
loyalty to the plan and its participants, namely the employees, 42  and
"discharge their obligations 'solely in the interest of the [plan] participants
and beneficiaries.' , 43  One court aptly described the principle as one that
requires execution of all Plan decisions "with an eye single to the interests of
139. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
140. Wellman & Clark, supra note 25, at 685-86. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2004).
Section 1104(a) states that
(1) Subject to sections 403(c) and (d), 4042, and 4044 [29 U.S.C. §§ 1103(c), (d), 1342,
1344) a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of
the participants and beneficiaries and-
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries;
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan; and
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like
aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large
losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as
such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this title and
title IV.
(2) In the case of an eligible individual account plan (as defined in section 407(d)(3) [29
U.S.C. § 1107(d)(3)]), the diversification requirement of paragraph (1)(C) and the
prudence requirement (only to the extent that it requires diversification) of paragraph
(1)(B) is not violated by acquisition or holding of any qualifying employer real property
or qualifying employer securities as defined in section 407(d)(4) and (5) [20 U.S.C. §
1107(d)(4)-(5)]).
Id.; see also Penn. Fed'n, Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees v. Norfolk S. Corp. Thoroughbred Ret.
Inv. Plan, No. 02-9049, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1987, at *8-9 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2004) (enumerating
the fiduciary duties under section 1104 but calling the duty to "act 'solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries"' the "overarching principle of ERISA") (quoting 29 U.S.C. §
I 104(a)(l)(A) (2004)).
141. Wellman & Clark, supra note 25, at 686 (citing to 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2004)).
142. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1); Cent. States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp.,
Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570-71 (1985); see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996) ("To
participate knowingly and significantly in deceiving a plan's beneficiaries in order to save the
employer money at the beneficiaries' expense is not to act 'solely in the interest of the participants
and beneficiaries."').
143. Stein v. Smith, 270 F. Supp. 2d 157, 166 (D. Mass. 2003) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)).
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the participants and beneficiaries. '"'44 Accordingly, a fiduciary also has the
duty to "'act for the exclusive purpose' of providing benefits to plan
beneficiaries."' 145 Thus, a fiduciary who favors his own self-interest or the
interests of a third party over those of the plan or its participants is liable for
breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.
146
Furthermore, ERISA imposes a duty to act as a "prudent man" under the
circumstances. 147  Generally, the duty of prudence requires fiduciaries to
properly assess the values and risks of a particular investment and to manage
and execute the investments accordingly. 148 The duty of prudence has other
significant limits, however, as it applies to ESOP administration only to the
extent that the conduct at issue does not involve diversification of plan
assets. 149 Moreover, ESOP fiduciaries enjoy a presumption that they have
acted rationally and in good faith, much akin to the common law "business
judgment rule." 50
But most relevant to potential securities fraud involving employer stock,
an ERISA fiduciary has a duty to diversify plan investments to avoid
substantial losses, also governed by a "prudent man" standard of care.'5 '
Such diversification is an integral element to the current pending litigations
in Enron, WorldCom, and the others, because the employee plans in those
cases held most if not all their investments in the employers' securities.
1 2
Generally, a fiduciary must diversify the assets of the plan portfolio in order
to guard against large losses to the plan.'53 The duty of prudence works
concurrently with the duty to diversify, as the fiduciary must administer the
plan, which includes managing the assets, such as a "prudent person, in a
like capacity and familiar with such matters, would use under the
144. Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1458 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Berlin v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co.,
858 F.2d 1154, 1162 (8th Cir. 1988)).
145. Id. (emphasis added); see also Penn. Fed'n, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1987, at *9-10 (finding
that plaintiffs did not adequately plead breach of duty to act for the exclusive purpose of participants
and beneficiaries' benefits where failed to allege any fiduciaries' self-interested motives); Wright v.
Or. Metallurgical Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1232 (D. Or. 2002).
146. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1); Wellman & Clark, supra note 25, at 694-95.
147. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
148. See Fink v. Nat'l Say. & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing Donovan v.
Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1983)).
149. § 1104(a)(2).
150. See Agresta-Richardson, supra note 111, at 100-02; see also infra note 313.
151. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
152. See In re Enron Corp. Secs., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 536 (S.D. Tex.
2003); In re WorldCom, Inc. Secs. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 392, 397-400 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re
Duke Energy ERISA Litig., 281 F. Supp. 2d 786, 788 (W.D.N.C. 2003).
153. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C); Wellman & Clark, supra note 25, at 696 (explaining that
diversification constitutes a separate and distinct duty apart from the general prudence requirement
in that "[e]ven where the investments themselves are relatively safe [i.e. in compliance with the duty
of prudence], the failure to diversify may expose the plan ... if the investments are illiquid").
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circumstances."' 154  However, ERISA also provides an exception from the
duty to diversify for employer stock-based programs.'55 In those cases, the
fiduciary need not diversify the assets; instead, the fiduciary need only
invest in the employer securities as mandated in the plan agreements
themselves. 5 6 Plan administration triggers fiduciary duties, but plan design
does not.'
57
b. Other Fiduciary Responsibilities: Duties of Accuracy in
Communication Regarding Plan Benefits and the Limited Duty to
Disclose
Finally, analogous to the prohibitions under the Securities Acts 58 and a
corollary to the duty of loyalty, a fiduciary cannot materially mislead a plan
participant or beneficiary when speaking about a plan. 59 The "discretionary
authority"' 6 for imposing fiduciary status arises and creates fiduciary
responsibilities where a plan administrator communicates with a plan
participant. 16' Statements and misrepresentations cannot impose fiduciary
liability unless it is shown that they constitute acts of "plan
administration.'' 62  Conversely, "making intentional representations about
the future of plan benefits," in the appropriate context, "is an act of plan
administration."' 163 Thus, establishing whether a particular action on the part
of a corporate officer or director constitutes an act of fiduciary responsibility
depends on whether the executive is clearly wearing his "fiduciary hat"
when making the alleged representations,164 a determination that relies on
154. Wellman & Clark, supra note 25, at 695 (citing § 1l04(a)(1)(B)); see supra note 147 and
accompanying text.
155. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2).
156. See Penn. Fed'n, Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees v. Norfolk S. Corp. Thoroughbred Ret.
Inv. Plan, No. 02-9049, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1987, at *8-9 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2004). "ERISA
further requires fiduciaries to comply with the plan as written unless it is inconsistent with ERISA."
Id. at *10 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D)).
157. In re Xcel Energy, Inc, Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 312 F. Supp. 2d1 165, 1181 (D.
Minn. 2004).
158. 15 U.S.C. § 780) (2004).
A misrepresentation by a person, whose position made it reasonable for a plaintiff to rely
upon that misrepresentation, about the value of a security, which was subsequently
bought or sold by the plaintiff in reliance upon that statement, will satisfy the requisite
"in connection with" a security for a § 10(b) claim.
In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 566-67 (S.D. Tex. 2003)
(citing In re Ames Dept. Stores, Inc. Stock Litig., 991 F.2d 953, 967 (2d Cir. 1993)).
159. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996) (stating that "lying is inconsistent with the
duty of loyalty owed by all fiduciaries and codified in section 404(a)(1) of ERISA") (citations
omitted).
160. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(21)(A)(i), (iii) (2004).
161. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 502-03; see also In re Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 556.
162. See Varify Corp., 516 U.S. at 505 (holding that "making intentional representations about the
future of plan benefits [connected to statements about the company's financial health] is an act of
plan administration").
163. Id. at 505 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 506; In re Enron Corp., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 565.
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the facts of the specific situation.165 The courts do not impose liability often,
however, unless the conduct may amount to "insider trading" in violation of
the Securities Acts.
166
Much like the disclosure requirements under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, ERISA also mandates disclosure of certain plan information to
participants and beneficiaries. 67 'The duty of disclosure under ERISA has
been described as 'an area of developing and controversial law.""' 168 Most
courts do not require disclosure of material information when such data
arises from business operations separate from an ERISA plan, 169 although
some courts have imposed "an affirmative duty to disclose material
information about which a plan participant would be unlikely to inquire."'
170
But a plan administrator's duty to "offer beneficiaries detailed plan
information" includes "conveying information about the likely future of plan
benefits, thereby permitting beneficiaries to make an informed choice about
continued participation.' 17 1 Thus, any misrepresentation, which may include
silence, 72 regarding the status of a corporation's "business health" amounts
to "plan administration" under ERISA and triggers fiduciary responsibilities
165. See Stein v. Smith, 270 F. Supp. 2d 157, 173 (D. Mass 2003). Under the "two-hat doctrine,"
a corporate officer wears an "employer hat" and a "fiduciary hat," thus often subject to conflicting
interests and, at times, conflicting fiduciary duties to the plan and to the corporation. Id.; see also In
re Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 550-51 (discussing the two-hat doctrine and distinguishing between
business functions versus ERISA fiduciary functions).
166. In re Enron Corp., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 565.
167. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1022, 1024(b)(1), 1025(a); see also Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 503.
168. In re Xcel Energy, Inc. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1176 (D.
Minn. 2004) (citing In re Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 555).
169. Kling v. Fid. Mgmt. Trust Co., 270 F. Supp. 2d 121, 129 (D. Mass. 2003).
170. In re Xcel Energy, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d at 1176; see, e.g., Watson v. Deaconess Waltham
Hosp., 298 F.3d 102, 114 (1st Cir. 2002); Anweiler v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986, 991
(7th Cir. 1993). As one court hopefully stated, after the Enron litigation, more circuits will adopt an
"affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose information beyond the traditional duties to disclose specified
in the statute or the common law." Hill v. BellSouth Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1368-69 (N.D.
Ga. 2004). But nonetheless, even now, the general rule only requires disclosure under certain
extreme circumstances. Id.
171. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 502-03 (1996). The duty to inform does not impose any
duty to provide participants with "investment advice." In re Unisys Say. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420,
443 (3d Cir. 1996). One court recently described the duty as one "where a fiduciary may need to
provide information about the nature of an investment offering, but should not sway an investor one
way or the other[, such as] disclos[ing] the relative risks associated with a particular fund as
compared to other funds offered by the Plan." Penn. Fed'n, Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees v.
Norfolk S. Corp. Thoroughbred Ret. Inv. Plan, No. 02-9049, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1987, at *15
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2004).
172. See Glaziers & Glassworkers Union Local No. 252 Annuity Fund v. Newbridge Secs., Inc.,
93 F.3d 1171, 1180 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that ERISA fiduciary duty to inform plan participants and
beneficiaries is "not only a negative duty not to misinform, but also an affirmative duty to inform
when the trustee knows that silence might be harmful") (quoting Bixler v. Cent. Penn. Teamsters
Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 2192, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993)); In re Xcel Energy, Inc, 312 F. Supp. 2d
at 1177.
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where the proffered information serves to aid employee investors in their
plan participation decisions. 73 For example, Enron included the erroneous
and misleading SEC filings in its ERISA Summary Plan Descriptions
distributed to employees, allegedly fraudulently inducing investment in
over-valued stock as opposed to other more stable investment options.
174
Furthermore, as in WorldCom's case, the Summary Plan Descriptions
ironically included the SEC reports so as to ensure the "safety and value of
the WorldCom stock-investment alternative within their 401(k) plan."1 75
Thus, inducement to invest in these companies' stock theoretically
constitutes claims for breach of fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence.
176
Moreover, failure to correct such misinformation, as in the case of
Enron, also invokes fiduciary duties. 177 Plan administrators must investigate
a company's financial health and the propriety of plan investments in such
company's stock, 78 a requirement tied to the duty of prudence.1 79 Therefore,
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA pension plans actually sound in
securities fraud to a certain degree, 80 as often times misrepresentations
regarding the value of employer stock constitute the relevant fiduciary
conduct giving rise to liability, akin to section 78j of the Securities Exchange
Act. But fortunately enough for a few plaintiffs, overlapping recovery under
securities statutes does not automatically dismiss an ERISA claim where the
defendants are charged with the breach of fiduciary duties to disclose
accurate information regarding stock prices parallel the "duties of disclosure
owed by a corporation and its officers to the corporation's shareholders,'' 8
sometimes providing multiple viable causes of action.18
2
173. See Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 502-03; In re Enron Corp. Secs., Derivative & ERISA Litig.,
284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 558 (S.D. Tex. 2003). As an example, in the Enron ERISA litigation, the
plaintiffs have successfully alleged that Enron and the Compensation Committee breached their
fiduciary duty to provide information necessary for Plan Administration, facts which in turn lead to a
finding of breach of a fiduciary duty to investigate. Id. at 537. The plaintiffs in Enron have offered
clear evidence that Enron directors all sold stock despite "exhorting" further purchases by employee
plan participants. Id.
174. In re Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 637.
175. Vivien v. WorldCom, Inc., No. C 02-01329 WHA, 2002 U.S. Dist. WL 31640557, at *7 n.3
(N.D. Cal. July 26, 2002).
176. In re Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 533.
177. See id. at 658-59. Additionally, the ERISA plaintiffs in Enron have also successfully alleged
a breach of fiduciary duty in the fiduciaries' conduct in causing and allowing Savings Plan to
purchase and accept matching contributions in Enron stock once the fiduciaries knew that it was
risky. Id. at 533.
178. See id. at 547-48.
179. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
180. See Vivien v. WorldCom, Inc., No. C 02-01329 WHA, 2002 U.S. Dist. WL 31640557, at *8
(N.D. Cal. July 26, 2002).
181. Id. (distinguishing Hull v. Policy Mgmt. Sys., No. CIV.A.3:00-778-17, 2001 WL 1836286,
at *5-8 (D.S.C. Feb. 9, 2001)). The court in Vivien read the holding in Hull narrowly to its facts, as
the employer in Hull had explicitly spelled out fiduciary duties in the plan which did not include the
duty to provide accurate information. Id. at *7. Instead, the court decided that Hull merely stood for
the proposition that only where the fiduciary duties are expressly limited should a court dismiss
ERISA claims alleging conduct that "amount[] to fraud on the market." Id.
182. Unfortunately for other plaintiffs, however, many employees cannot state actionable claims
under either statutory scheme and will not recover at all. See infra Parts IV-A-2 & V-C.
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IV. THE OVERLAPS IN THE CURRENT STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND WHY
BLINDLY "APPLYING THE SECURITIES LAWS" DOES NOT ADEQUATELY
SUPPLEMENT THE ERISA STATUTORY FRAMEWORK: THE NEED FOR
UNIFORM HIGH STANDARDS OF REGULATION AND PROTECTION FOR ALL
EMPLOYEE INVESTMENT PLANS
A. Securities Laws Already Apply to a Limited Degree yet Do Not
Sufficiently Account for All Employee Investing Concerns Because Only
Certain Programs Qualify for Protection Under the Securities Acts
Where the relevant conduct is not "plan administration" subject to the
fiduciary standards of ERISA, some plaintiffs may state a claim for relief
instead under the securities laws.' 83 As explained above, an employee stock
benefit or pension plan constitutes a "security" under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 depending on whether the plan is voluntary versus
involuntary and individually contributory as opposed to noncontributory. 84
The Securities Exchange Act regulations apply to employee interests in a
stock-based plan only where employees voluntarily participate in and
individually contribute to the plan. 85 Voluntary contribution plans amount
to investment contracts akin to securities.
86
Some commentators contend that applying the Securities Acts across the
board to certain stock-based programs as a supplement to ERISA would
ameliorate employee stockholder concerns by entitling employees to the
same protections available to public investors. 87 While such a proposal may
hold true, it is nonetheless short-sighted and limited, as it fails to address the
even more pressing and long-term needs explicitly intended in the ERISA
statutory scheme. As noted above, ERISA seeks to ensure "fairer and more
effective [programs] in providing retirement income for employees[,]', 88 and
while the Securities Acts provide causes of action for serious misconduct,
employee investors still need safeguards by requiring heightened standards
of ERISA fiduciary duties to guarantee that their funds are safe. Therefore;
the main sticking point between the two statutory schemes lies in the fact
that the laws, and thus the legal bases for recovery, apply inconsistently to
183. Stein v. Smith, 270 F. Supp. 2d 157, 173 & n.4 (D. Mass 2003).
184. See Employee Benefit Plans, SEC Release No. 33-6188, 1 Fed. Sec. Rep. (CCH) 1051 at
2073-6 n.19-20 (Feb. 1, 1980) ("SEC Release"); In re Enron Corp. Secs., Derivative & ERISA
Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511,636-40 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
185. SEC Release, at 2073-3, 7; see In re Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 639-40.
186. SEC Release, at 2073-9; see also Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 570
(1979).
187. See, e.g., Hogle, supra note 26 (arguing that ESOPs should have express remedies under the
Securities Acts).
188. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, pt. 1, at 4670 (1974).
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EIAPs despite involving the same alleged conduct, the same employer
securities, and the same losses. It seems ironic, however, that the interests of
retirement plans cannot enjoy at least the same level of comfort as the
investing public.
1. Overlap of the Securities Laws over ERISA in ESOP Administration
Already Produces Inconsistent Results
a. ESOPs as Securities
It is clear that a typical ESOP does not possess the "pension-type"
secure deferred compensation that ERISA purports to regulate,18 9 as an
ESOP "does not have the primary indicia of a pension plan-i.e., the
payment of benefits only upon retirement."' 90 One commentator has stated
that
It]he substitution of an ESOP for compensation the employee would
otherwise have been entitled to receive in cash is not likely to
produce future compensation for the employee actuarially (or
otherwise) equivalent in value to the foregone cash
compensation.... [An employee could receive much less than the
foregone compensation if the company performs poorly. This risk
factor makes the substitution of the ESOP resemble much more the
acquisition of an equity interest in a company than an ordinary
deferred compensation arrangement.'19
Characterizing ESOPs as securities has instigated a great deal of legal
controversy, as courts have struggled with the interpretation of the Supreme
Court holding in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 192
which defined "compulsory' ' 193 and "noncontributory"' 194 as the dispositive
factors in determining whether to classify an interest in employer stock as a
"security.'" 95 While several courts have refused to apply federal securities
laws to ESOPs,196 most have found ESOPs to fit the definition of "security"
as set forth in Daniel and the earlier SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. 19 7 Howey used
189. See Stanley Keller, Employee Equity Incentive Arrangements, 19 REV. OF SEC. &
COMMODITIES REG., 156 (1986) (distinguishing between an "investment securities plan" and a
"compensatory securities plan").
190. Hood v. Smith's Transfer Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1274, 1290 (W.D. Ky. 1991) (emphasis
added).
191. Mario L. Baeza & Laura A. Taylor, The Applicability of Federal Securities Laws to
Employee Bargained-For ESOPs, 680 PRAc. L. INST. CORP. 703, 717-18 (1990) (emphasis added).
192. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566-67 (1979).
193. "Compulsory" indicates that the employer imposed the benefit plan as a condition of
employment. See Daniel, 439 U.S. at 553.
194. "Noncontributory" meant that "[t]he employees paid nothing to the plan themselves." Id.
195. See id. at 566-67; see also Bodie, supra note 15, at 555-58; Hogle, supra note 26, at 197.
196. See, e.g., Childers v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1357 (D. Minn. 1988).
197. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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the term "investment contract" to define a "security": an investment contract
is a "scheme involv[ing] an investment of money in a common enterprise
with profits to come solely from the efforts of others."' 98 Daniel in turn split
the Howey rule into two elements: the compulsory and non-contributory
nature of the program.' 99 Thus, technically an ordinary ESOP such as the
ones at issue in Enron, WorldCom, and others, fits the "investment contract"
mold akin to the pension plan in the Daniel case, as the employees' stock is
only distributed when the interest has vested, in turn giving rise to the
"investment contract" analysis under Daniel and Howey.200 Additionally, as
noted above, the essence of the ESOP is employee stock distribution and
ownership, just like in the public marketplace, which by itself intuitively
constitutes a "security. 20' Therefore, courts finding that ESOPs amount to
securities point out that the basic "'fundamentals of the underlying
transaction'-namely, the distribution of employer stock to employees[,]"
likely render an ESOP subject to the securities laws.2 °2 Thus, it is arguably
somewhat settled that "ESOPs constitute certificates of interest or
participation in stock and therefore fall within the purview of the [Securities]
Acts by default.,
2 3
b. ESOPs and Their Technical Classification Under ERISA
Thus, an ESOP surpasses the scope of ERISA in that it arguably falls
within the definition of a "security" for purposes of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
There, as a "security," ESOP participants may state causes of action under
sections 77 and 78 for fraudulent misrepresentations and other conduct
198. ld.at 301.
199. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 570 (1979) ("We hold that the Securities
Acts do not apply to a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan.").
200. Id.
201. See Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutrition Inst., Inc., 751 F.2d 555, 558 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Stock
is indubitably a security within the definitions of the Securities Act[s]."). Courts also look to the
parties' reasonable expectations, specifically the circumstances of the "sale," to determine whether
the employee purchaser believed that the Securities Acts would govern the transactions, see Hood v.
Smith's Transfer Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1274 (W.D. Ky. 1991), as well as to what extent the ESOP in
question more closely resembles traditional stock or traditional pension programs. See Harris v.
Republic Airlines, Inc., CIVA No. 86-2147 1988 WL 56256 at *7 (D.D.C. May 19, 1988) (holding
that an employee agreement to join an ESOP for salary reductions and the current surrender of
pension plan participation is a transaction governed by securities laws because the deal constituted
not only income deferral but also a "fairly speculative capital investment in the Company[, as the
employees] were not simply being asked to accept the same compensation package in a different-
presumably deferred-form"). See also Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985);
Hood, 762 F. Supp. at 1274.
202. Bodie, supra note 15, at 557-58 (quoting Harris v. Republic Airlines, CIVA No. 86-2147
1988 WL 56256 at *10 (D.D.C. May 19, 1988)).
203. See Hogle, supra note 26, at 240 (citing Landreth, 471 U.S. at 681, to argue that ESOPs
absolutely fall within the Securities Acts).
relating to the purchase of their company stock.2 °" But in principle, ESOP
programs constitute repeated sales of employer stock to the employee
buyer 20 5 as a form of deferred compensation governed by ERISA.2 °6 The
causes of action under the 1933 and 1934 Acts and ERISA are not mutually
exclusive though; in fact, the two statutory schemes supplement each other
in the ESOP context,2°7 with ERISA's restricted remedial provisions
arguably taking a weaker position to the expansive causes of action available
under the securities laws.20 8
Notwithstanding the arguments for classifying ESOPs as securities and
thus permitting causes of action under both statutory schemes, ERISA still
technically regulates the administration of ESOPs. However, the securities
laws merely pick up the slack where ERISA falls terribly short in protecting
the financial interests of ESOP participants. Admittedly, an ESOP fiduciary
is still governed by the traditional ERISA duties of loyalty and prudence. 209
But an ESOP fiduciary does not have a duty to diversify the ESOP's
investments, 210 and courts construe the limited exceptions, such as the duty
to investigate, very narrowly.1 Instead of expressly requiring an ESOP
fiduciary to meet the same requirements that the other deferred
compensation plans' fiduciaries must meet, the ESOP fiduciaries, who are
often one in the same as those entrusted with the other plans' administration,
face taking inconsistent actions in managing the different plans. Courts have
excused the exemption by positing that ERISA still specifically mandates
that an ESOP trustee act prudently 212 and in the best interests of the Plan and
its participants and beneficiaries, 213 which supposedly imposes the duty to
diversify in a limited sense, namely diversifying when investment in the
employer stock no longer constitutes a "prudent" investment.2"4
204. See, e.g., Yoder, 751 F.2d at 555; Hood, 762 F. Supp at 1274.
205. See Employee Benefits Plan, Exchange Release No. 33-6188, 1980 WL 29482 (Feb. 1, 1980)
(finding that individual stock agreements constitute "sales of securities" for purposes of the Acts).
206. See 29 U.S.C. § 1 107(d)(3) (2004).
207. See, e.g., Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, 940 F.2d 564, 581-86 (10th Cir.
1991) (holding that ERISA did not preempt the Securities Acts).
208. See id. (finding that ERISA did not preempt causes of action under the 1933 and 1934
securities acts because ERISA does not require "'relevant, accurate information upon which to base
an investment decision"' to be disclosed nor does it account for fraudulent conduct or
misrepresentations) (citations omitted); see also Hogle, supra note 26, at 229-34 (calling the theories
of relief under ERISA an "inadequate substitute for the protections afforded by the Securities Acts"
in arguing for the express application of securities laws to ESOP plans).
209. Kuper v. lovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1458 (6th Cir. 1995).
210. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) (2004). However, the duty to diversify applies in a limited sense
when the employee in question nears retirement. See Michael W. Melton, Demythologizing ESOPs,
45 TAX L. REv. 363, 397 (1990); see also Blum, supra note 38, at 1554 & n.65 ("[Approaching
retirement] represents one of the few instances where the retirement security policies of ERISA win
out over employee stock ownership.") (citing Melton, supra note 210, at 397).
211. Kuper, 66 F.3d at 1460 (finding that although fiduciaries who do not adequately investigate
and assess the viability of investment in employer securities only provides a narrow exception to the
general presumption that diversification in an ESOP portfolio is not required).
212. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
213. Id.
214. Kuper, 66 F.3d at 1458.
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Accordingly, courts suggest that investment in a faltering company may
constitute a violation of that fiduciary duty of prudence,2 5 which in turn
would give rise to an action under 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). Thus, ESOPs are
clearly subject to lesser standards of fiduciary care, apparently an element of
their "investment" character.21 6 Nonetheless, even though the duty of
prudence and the duty to "administer the plan solely in the interests of plan
participants" are standards applicable to all programs under the ERISA
statutory framework, by continuing to completely exempt ESOPs from the
duty to diversify will not only cause problems of administration in requiring
different standards of conduct but more importantly, in cases of fiduciary
misconduct, will likely also produce further inconsistent results between
ESOPs and other eligible account plans in litigated cases.217
2. The Loophole Between Securities Laws and the RICO Amendment
Entirely Bars Certain Plaintiffs from Recovery
Furthermore, EIAP plaintiffs generally cannot sustain RICO claims
because "[w]here RICO predicate offenses are an integral part of and sustain
an alleged securities fraud Ponzi scheme,218 they are intrinsically conduct
undertaken 'in connection with the purchase or sale of securities' and are
barred by the RICO Amendment. '219 The RICO Amendment provides that
"embezzlement, mail and wire fraud, obstruction of justice, and interstate
transportation offenses" combine to form the same, singular scheme that
constitutes the basis for the securities actions under Title 15, therefore
barring duplicate causes of action.220  However, essentially consolidating
RICO actions into securities litigation cuts certain plaintiffs off from
recovery. Phantom stock program and bonus plan participants "fall through
the cracks" because the interests involved do not constitute actionable
215. Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 572 (3d Cir. 1995).
216. See Steinman v. Hicks, 352 F.3d 1101 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that the duty to diversify only
applies in a very limited manner in the ESOP context but that the duty of prudence still applies).
217. Kuper, 66 F.3d at 1458 ("Thus, 'ESOP fiduciaries.., are expected to administer ESOP
investments consistent with the provisions of both a specific employee benefits plan and ERISA' ...
These competing concerns make it more difficult to delineate the responsibilities of ESOP trustees.")
(citations omitted).
218. See BRIAN CRUVER, ANATOMY OF GREED: THE UNSHREDDED TRUTH FROM AN ENRON
INSIDER 180 (Carroll & Graf 2002) [hereinafter ANATOMY OF GREED] (defining the term "Ponzi
scheme" as a reference to Charles Ponzi, the 1920's con man who defrauded investors into giving
him $9.5 million on false assurances that he could make a 50 percent return in less than two months
and later faced bankruptcy and jail time when his scheme died out).
219. In re Enron Secs. & Derivative Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 648-49 (S.D. Tex 2003) (citing
and quoting Bald Eagle Area Sch. Dist. v. Keystone Fin., Inc., 189 F.3d 321, 329-330 (3d Cir.
1999)). The RICO Amendment, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 107, 109 Stat. 737, 758 (1995), adds to 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c).
220. In re Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 648-49; see also Bald Eagle, 189 F.3d at 329-30.
"securities" within the meaning of the Securities Acts, and the RICO
Amendment still bars their claims for fraud for losses suffered by the decline
in value of their holdings.22' Therefore, although "plan participants' actual
losses in essence are the same financial losses suffered by all...
shareholders, 222 not all plaintiffs can successfully assert claims under the
Securities Acts and yet cannot find legal relief elsewhere.
B. ERISA 's Shortcomings
The recent scandals clearly caught the financial world and employee
investors alike off guard, and federal laws were simply not prepared to cope
with the flood of diverse claims under almost every one of the multitude of
different employee programs. Thousands of employees lost their entire
livelihoods under ERISA-governed programs based on employer securities,
whether ESOP or traditional individual deferred compensation plans, and
have filed complicated, "kitchen-sink" style suits claiming damages against
innumerable defendants in hopes of recovering even a portion of what was
lost from the faltering, now-bankrupt corporations and those agents who
perpetrated the costly misconduct.
1. Section 404(c) Defenses Strictly Limit the Imposition of Liability
First, where the plan participants exercise some level of control over the
investment choices of his or her pension fund, the persons or entities
otherwise serving as fiduciaries may in fact enjoy immunity from liability
for breach of the fiduciary duties under ERISA.223 Section 1104(c)(1)(B)
holds that
In the case of a pension plan which provides for individual accounts
and permits a participant or beneficiary to exercise control over the
assets in his account, if a participant or beneficiary exercises control
over the assets in his account (as determined under regulations of
the Secretary)-...
(B) no person who is otherwise a fiduciary shall be liable under this
part for any loss, or by reason of any breach, which results from
such participant's or beneficiary's exercise of control.224
"Whether a participant or beneficiary has exercised independent control in
fact with respect to a transaction depends on the facts and circumstances of
the particular case. 225
221. In re Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 652.
222. Id. at 649.
223. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(B).
224. Id.
225. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(c)(2).
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For example, the Enron Savings Plan Trust Agreement designated the
Northern Trust as the Savings Plan Trustee and enumerated its fiduciary
responsibilities and powers.226 The ESOP Trust Agreement similarly
designated the Trustee and Administrative Committee with the same
fiduciary duties and powers.227 WorldCom, by contrast, offered employees
some level of control over plan diversification and investment choices, facts
which may lead to section 404(c) immunity for the defendants.228
Ordinarily, liability for another's investment choices would not make any
sense. But employer securities are a different breed, as the world has seen:
employees invest in their employer's stock not only in reliance on upper
management recommendation but also without full knowledge of many
company circumstances just as a public investor, choosing to participate in
support of the entity that purportedly sustains their livings, often as part of a
collectively-bargained agreement and hardly with any extra "insider"
information.2 It is no longer appropriate to assume that because an
employee works for a particular organization that he knows everything that
happens and can make better informed decisions about his investments than
the public. Bestowing blanket immunity to fiduciaries in cases where
employees exercise discretion over their deferred compensation account
226. In re Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 654-55. While the Northern Trust had a duty of "holding,
managing, caring for and protecting the assets of the Plan, including investing and reinvesting those
assets, [and] su[ing] or defend[ing] claims against the Trust Fund," it also provides that the Trustee
may "compromise, contest, prosecute or abandon claims in favor or against the Fund." Id. at 654
n.144 (citing Article V of the Savings Plan Trust Agreement). Furthermore, the Savings Plan also
explicitly sets forth Northern Trust's fiduciary duties, stating:
Notwithstanding Article Five:
6.1 The powers of the Trustee shall be exercisable for the exclusive purpose of
providing benefits to the Participants and Beneficiaries under the Plan and in
accordance with the standards of a prudent person under ERISA;
6.2 Subject to 6.1 and 6.3, the Trustee shall diversify the investments of that
portion of the fund of which it has investment responsibility so as to minimize the
risk of large losses;
6.3 Subject to 6.1, the Trustee shall, with respect to that portion of the Fund for
which it has investment responsibility, follow the investment guidelines established
by the Administrative Committee and shall act in accordance with the direction of
the Administrative Committee.
6.7 No provisions of Sections 6.5 or 6.6 [addressing direction of the trustee by plan
participants] shall prevent the Trustee from taking any action relating to its duties under
Sections 6.5 or 6.6 if the Trustee determines in its sole discretion that such action is
necessary in order for the Trustee to fulfill its fiduciary responsibilities.
Id. at 655.
227. Id.
228. See discussion infra; see also Vivien v. WorldCom, Inc., No. C 02-01329 WHA, 2002 U.S.
Dist. WL 31640557, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2002).
229. See Bodie, supra note 15, at 575-76 (positing that Enron's collapse "provides a contemporary
example of the differences in information access between high-level executives and lower-level
employees").
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investments will only help perpetrate further frauds and more future losses to
plans and their participants.
2. Interpretations of ERISA Pose Further Hurdles to Plaintiffs'
Recovery in Claiming Breach of Fiduciary Duty
In theory, Congress proposed that "ERISA is considered to be a
remedial statute, and remedies are to be liberally construed."23 But often
times, plaintiffs find themselves without remedy for breaches of fiduciary
duty under courts' stringent statutory interpretations. Generally, a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA requires the plaintiff to show that the
defendant was a plan fiduciary and breached a fiduciary duty while acting
within the fiduciary capacity."2 Establishing that companies, administrative
committees, and individual directors and officers had fiduciary
responsibilities to plan participants poses one significant legal hurdle for the
plaintiffs to overcome.232 Furthermore, unlike the Securities Acts, in cases
of alleged fraud often times the misrepresentations or other misconduct in
question do not or cannot state a claim for relief based on the stringent,
technical standards set forth in case precedent.
a. Plaintiffs Claiming Breach of EIAP Fiduciary Duty to Diversify Can
Rarely Surmount the Stringent "Abuse of Discretion" Standard
While supposedly imposing fiduciary duties giving rise to civil liability
would appear to provide ample deterrence for any violations thereof, Enron
and its contemporaries have proven the critics to be right,233 as the duty to
"act solely for the benefit of plan participants" has not afforded sufficient
protection. 2 4 Adding insult to injury, courts have in turn applied the "abuse
of discretion" standard to plan diversification issues rather unforgivingly,
only finding an actual violation of fiduciary duty in very limited
circumstances.235
230. Wellman & Clark, supra note 25, at 703. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 17, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655 (stating that ERISA serves to provide "participants and beneficiaries with
broad remedies for redressing or preventing violations of the Act").
231. 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2004); Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 255-56 (2000).
232. See, e.g., Vivien v. WorldCom, Inc., No. C 02-01329 WHA, 2002 WL 31640557, at *3-4
(N.D. Cal. July 26, 2002). Persons and entities other than the "named fiduciary" gain fiduciary
status depending on conduct and authority, as "ERISA... defines 'fiduciary' not in terms of formal
trusteeship, but in functional terms of control and authority over the plan." Mertens v. Hewitt
Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993); see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2004). Thus a "person's actions,
not the official designation of his role," dictates whether to impose fiduciary responsibility. Acosta
v. Pac. Enter., 950 F.2d 611,618 (9th Cir. 1991).
233. See Dougall, supra note 15, at 719 (calling the ERISA fiduciary duty to act solely for
participants' benefits "insufficient in practice" because of divergent "interested constituencies").
234. See Blum, supra note 38, at 1557 (stating that, in the ESOP context, the "abuse of discretion
standard serves little purpose").
235. See Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 572 (3d Cir. 1995) (describing situation where an
employer issuer faced "impending collapse" as circumstances potentially warranting the imposition
of the duty to diversify in the ESOP context); see also Kuper v. lovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1460 (6th
Cir. 1995) (finding that holding employer securities even when the stock prices fell did not constitute
706
[Vol. 32: 671, 2005] It's Payback Time, or Is It?
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
The Third Circuit in Moench v. Robertson23 6 devised a presumption that
an EIAP fiduciary did not "abuse discretion" by investing in the employer's
stock.2 37  Under Moench, "an [EIAP] 238 fiduciary who invests the assets in
employer stock is entitled to a presumption that it acted consistently with
ERISA by virtue of that decision. However, the plaintiff may overcome that
presumption by establishing that the fiduciary abused its discretion by
investing in employer securities,, 239 a principle founded on ERISA's
relationship to traditional trust law.240  Thus Moench effectively raised the
burden for plaintiffs claiming fiduciary violations. For one, ESOPs would
rarely fall victim to an "abuse of discretion," as there is simply not very
much room for fiduciaries to act in the first place because ESOP plan
specifications, by definition, require that the fiduciary invest in a certain
high percentage of employer stock.241 Additionally, as ESOP fiduciaries are
not subject to the duty to diversify,242 the duties to "act in the participants'
best interests" and to "act prudently" 243 stand as the sole remedies for many
cases of misconduct, 244 and often the losses suffered sound too close to
portfolio diversification arguments to constitute actionable claims.245
a breach of fiduciary duty); Wright v. Or. Metallurgical Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1233-34 (D.
Or. 2002) (denying plaintiffs relief where no allegations of "unusual circumstances that would give
rise to an exception to the general rule that an ESOP fiduciary's decision to hold employer stock is
consistent with ERISA's prudence requirement").
236. 62 F.3d 553, 571 (3d Cir. 1995).
237. Id. The Ninth Circuit has recently followed the Third Circuit's lead, adopting the Moench
standard of review in Wright v. Oregon Metallurgical Corp., 360 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2004).
238. While Moench specifically dealt with an ESOP, its test applies to all EIAPs, including both
ESOPs as well as traditional 401(k) pension plans. See Penn. Fed'n, Bhd. of Maint. of Way
Employees v. Norfolk S. Corp. Thoroughbred Ret. Inv. Plan, No. 02-9049, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1987, at *21-22 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2004) (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that the Moench presumption
does not apply to their 401(k) program fiduciaries and stating instead that "the distinction between
ESOP and other types of EIAPs, such as profit sharing plans and savings plans, is irrelevant").
239. Moench, 62 F.3d at 571 (emphasis added).
240. Id. at 566 (relying on the Restatement (Second) of Trusts section 187 to state that "[w]here
discretion is conferred upon the trustee with respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise is not
subject to control by the court, except to prevent an abuse by the trustee of his discretion"); see also
Penn. Fed'n, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1987, at *22 (quoting Moench, 62 F.3d at 566).
241. See Blum, supra note 38, at 1555-56.
242. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) (2004).
243. See Steinman v. Hicks, 352 F.3d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 2003) (positing that while "in the
ESOP context where there is no duty to diversify... [tihere is still a duty of prudence").
244. See id.
245. ERISA specifically mandates that the duty of prudence excludes any diversification aspects
in the EIAP context. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2). Accordingly, courts repeatedly state that any
claims of fiduciary breach sounding in the failure to diversify absent extraordinary circumstances do
not constitute causes of action under ERISA. See Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 572 (3d Cir.
1995); Kuper v. lovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1460 (6th Cir. 1995); Wright v. Or. Metallurgical Corp., 222
F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1233-34 (D. Or. 2002) (denying plaintiffs relief where no allegations of "unusual
circumstances that would give rise to an exception to the general rule that an ESOP fiduciary's
decision to hold employer stock is consistent with ERISA's prudence requirement").
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Likewise, traditional EIAP 401(k) program plaintiffs also find that the
limited duty to diversify bars recovery absent extraordinary
circumstances. 246
b. The Vigorous Dissent in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance
Company v. Knudson Demonstrates the Ostensible Contradiction
between the Judiciary's Narrow Reading of ERISA and Its
Underlying Purposes and Policies
Courts interpret the general ERISA enforcement provisions strictly as
well, ironically again citing deference to "congressional intent., 247 That the
judiciary has held such intent to limit ERISA to the expressly enumerated
causes of action is clearly evinced by the "carefully crafted and detailed
enforcement scheme., 248 The Supreme Court in Great-West Life & Annuity
Insurance Company v. Knudson recently stated that it is fairly clear that
"'Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to
incorporate expressly,' 249 a pronouncement that will effectively prohibit
any expansive judicial interpretations of the ERISA causes of action.
But the Court only so stated by a narrow five-to-four margin, with
Justices Ginsburg and Stevens drafting dissenting opinions rejecting the
argument that Congress specifically intended to limit, rather than expand,
the remedies under ERISA °50 Justice Stevens remarked that expansive
interpretation "accomplishes Congress's goal of providing a federal remedy
for violations of the terms of plans covered by ERISA" and that "[clontrary
to the Court's current reluctance to conclude that wrongs should be
remedied ... the historical presumption favoring the provision of remedies
for violations of federal rights should inform our construction of the
remedial provisions of federal statutes."25' Instead, "where federally-
protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning
that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary
relief."
252
The contradiction is clear. On the one hand "the legislative history of
ERISA indicates that the avenues of relief and the right of action afforded
pension plan participants should be generously construed 253 while other
246. See Steinman, 352 F.3d at 1106; Penn. Fed'n, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1987, at *22.
247. See, e.g., Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002).
248. Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 251, 254 (1993) (citing Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1985) and strictly construing the term "equitable relief' under 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)). See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 209.
249. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 209 (citing Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 473 U.S. at 146-47).
250. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 221 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 224 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 222 & n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534
U.S. 61 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)), Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 294-97 (2001)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) and Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392
(1971)).
252. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971) (citing to Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
253. Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 634, 639 (D.D.C. 1985) (emphasis
added).
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statutory pronouncements and the judiciary, through the Supreme Court
decision in Great-West254 and prior rulings,25  have instead imposed a
contrary intention to limit the avenues of relief for ERISA participants. And,
with the recent employee losses brought on by the conduct of Enron and
WorldCom fiduciaries, the time has clearly arrived to expand the statutory
causes of action in ERISA, whether through court interpretation or
legislative change.
V. SARBANES-OXLEY AND THE MOVEMENT TOWARD REFORM: CHANGES IN
FEDERAL LAW RELEVANT TO EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP AND PENSION
PROGRAMS
In 2002, Congress quickly reacted to the Enron and WorldCom fallout
by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a move designed to impose greater
liability and standards of care on corporations and their officers with regards
to their securities. 256 First and foremost, Sarbanes-Oxley imposes the first
major overhaul of corporate accounting and financial disclosure, setting
forth new rules and requirements such as the establishment of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board25 7 and director certification of
financial reports 2 8s to better regulate and supervise the public securities
254. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 209.
255. See Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1985) (prohibiting extra-
contractual or punitive damages in ERISA causes of action on the grounds that Congress did not
expressly authorize such awards).
256. Id. The first page of the Act states that it is "[a]n Act to protect investors by improving the
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other
purposes." Id. Senator Sarbanes stated that the Act serves to "address systemic and structural
weaknesses ... revealed in... a breakdown in corporate financial.., responsibility." 148 CONG.
REc. S6327-06 (daily ed. July 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
257. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101, codified as 15 U.S.C. § 7211.
258. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2004). The officer must certify that he has
reviewed the report and that based on his knowledge the reports do not contain any material
misstatements and provide a good representation of the company's true financial condition. Id.
Furthermore, the officers must take responsibility for establishing internal controls and disclosing
material financial information to other officers. Id. The Act also imposes criminal sanctions for
signing off on any knowing violations included in the reports. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906(a)
(codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1350). The new section specifically states that
(a) Each periodic report [i.e., SEC filing] containing financial statements filed by an
issuer with the Securities Exchange Commission pursuant to section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)) shall be accompanied by a
written statement by the chief executive officer and chief financial officer (or equivalent
thereof) of the issuer.
(b) The statement required under subsection (a) shall certify that the periodic report
containing the financial statements fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)) and that
information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the issuer.
(c) Whoever
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market. Additionally, the Act, through its Title VIII, 259 added new deterrents
to fraudulent activity, such as criminal penalties for altering documents, 60
defrauding shareholders of publicly-traded companies, 26 ' as well as
enhanced penalties for acting in violation of ERISA 262 and the 1934
Securities Exchange Act.
263
But the question remains whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act constitutes an
effective solution to aid the unnecessary losses by pension plans and other
employee investments in employer stock. The likely answer is "no" for
several reasons. While the Act somewhat facilitates recovery in pure
securities actions, such as through eliminating bankruptcy discharge of debts
(1) certifies any statement as set forth in subsections (a) and (b) of this section
knowing that the periodic report accompanying the statement does not comport with
all the requirements set forth in this section shall be fined not more than $1,000,000
or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both; or
(2) willfully certifies any statement as set forth in subsections (a) and (b) of this
section knowing that the periodic report accompanying the statement does not
comport with all the requirements set forth in this section shall be fined not more
than $5,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
Id.
259. The "Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act," or Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, serves
to provide for criminal prosecution and enhanced penalties of persons who defraud
investors in publicly traded securities or alter or destroy evidence in certain Federal
investigations, to disallow debts incurred in violation of securities fraud laws from being
discharged in bankruptcy, to protect whistleblowers who report fraud against retaliation
by their employers, and other purposes.
S. REP. No. 107-146, at 2 (2002).
260. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 802. The Act adds criminal penalties to an accountant, such as Arthur
Andersen, who
knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry
in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or
influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction
of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 1l, or in
relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title
[Title 18--criminal penalties], imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2004). The Act further adds penalties for the destruction of corporate audit
records as well. See 18 U.S.C. § 1520 (2004) (as amended by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).
261. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 807. The relevant addition to 18 U.S.C. § 1348 imposes criminal
penalties on
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice-
(1) to defraud any person in connection with any security of an issuer with a class
of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. § 78/) or that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78o(d); or
(2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, any money or property in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security of an issuer with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 781 or that is required to file reports
under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78o(d)).
Id.
262. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 904 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1131). Sarbanes-Oxley greatly amplifies
the penalties imposed for violating fiduciary duties under ERISA.
263. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1106 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a)). The new penalties are
significantly higher, both in fine amounts and potential years imprisoned, for any violations of the
Securities Exchange Act.
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incurred as a result of securities law violations, 264 the Act fails to impact the
employee stockholder context on the whole in any meaningful or consistent
way. Instead, the Act leaves plenty of room for subsequent legislative
activity and interpretation to come to the aid of all EIAP employee
stockholders.
A. Sarbanes-Oxley Prescribed a Bright-Line Rule that Debts Incurred in
Securities Violations Are Not Dischargeable in Bankruptcy but Did Not
Prescribe a Parallel Provision for Breaches of ERISA Fiduciary Duties
Sarbanes-Oxley provides relief to securities fraud victims attempting to
secure their rights as creditors in the defendants' bankruptcy proceedings, an
amendment covering only a limited number of employee investors.265 The
Act provides in relevant part that debts are not dischargeable that
(A) [are] for
(i) the violation of any of the Federal securities laws (as that
term is defined in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934),266 any of the State securities laws, or any
regulation or order issued under such Federal or State securities
laws; or
(ii) common law fraud, deceit, or manipulation in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security; and
(B) results from-
(i) any judgment, order, consent order, or decree entered in any
Federal or State judicial or administrative proceeding;
(ii) any settlement agreement entered into by the debtor; or
(iii) any court or administrative order for any damages, fine,
penalty, citation, restitutionary payment, disgorgement
264. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 803 (adding subsection (19) to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)). See also infra
Part V-A.
265. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 803 (adding subsection (19) to II U.S.C. § 523(a)).
266. "Securities laws" are defined in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act to include
both the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, the Public Utility Holding Company Act, the Trust
Indenture Act, the Investment Advisers Act, and the Securities Investor Protection Act. In re
Gibbons, 289 B.R. 588, 592 n.6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).
payment, attorney fee, cost, or other payment owed by the
debtor.267
"The section, by its terms, applies to both statutory claims under the
securities laws and common law fraud, so long as it arises in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security. 268 Congress closed the "loophole"
in the bankruptcy code that sometimes allowed "wrongdoers to discharge
their obligations under court judgments or settlements based on securities
fraud and other securities violations. 269 Moreover, section 308(a)'s "fair
funds" rule affords further relief to victims of securities violations by
overriding bankruptcy code priorities and effectively redistributing the
issuer's assets to the shareholders as unsecured creditors, much like tort
claimants. 270 The new laws also serve to help avoid re-litigation of securities
fraud claims in bankruptcy court by imposing a bright-line rule regarding the
preclusive effect of prior court judgments and settlements.27' Additionally,
bankruptcy courts have already decided that the Act's provisions should
apply retroactively.272
But the improvements in protections afforded to securities purchasers
clearly does not apply equally to all employee investors. Section 523(a)(4),
left unaltered by Sarbanes-Oxley, governs debts arising from a breach of
fiduciary duty, such as under ERISA.273 Section 523(a)(4) requires that the
plaintiff show "(1) the existence of either an express or technical trust; (2)
the status of being a fiduciary of such a trust; and (3) fraud or defalcation
while acting in the capacity of a fiduciary of such a trust., 274 Such statutory
requirements essentially amount to forced re-litigation of the prior ERISA
proceedings in order to protect creditor status, 275 as the "defalcation" and
"fraud" definitions under bankruptcy common law interpretation may in fact
vary from the conduct constituting the substantive claim. 276 Thus, unlike in
the securities law context, Sarbanes-Oxley failed to provide the same
267. 11 U.S.C. § 523(19) (2004).
268. In re Gibbons, 289 B.R. at 592.
269. S. REP. No. 107-146, at 10 (2002).
270. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 308(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a)). Both civil penalties and
disgorged profits are recoverable from violators and become part of a "disgorgement fund" for
injured shareholders. See generally Douglas A. Henry, Comment, Subordinating Subordination:
WorldCom and the Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley's Fair Funds Provision on Distributions in Bankruptcy,
21 BANK. DEV. J. 259 (2004).
271. S. REP. No. 107-146, at 10 (2002); see also Gibbons, 289 B.R. at 592-95 (detailing
Congressional intent in ruling on the retroactivity of the Sarbanes-Oxley provisions).
272. In re Gibbons, 289 B.R. at 594-97 (finding that section 523(a)(19) should be applied in
existing bankruptcy proceedings given a "section-by-section" analysis of Congressional intent under
the test set forth in Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 268 (1994)).
273. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2004).
274. In re Eisenberg, 189 B.R. 725, 730 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1995).
275. See id. (demonstrating that a court necessarily must reexamine the merits of a plaintiff's
ERISA claim in ruling on a section 523(a)(4) creditor cause of action).
276. Id. (stating that the plaintiff must show that the defendant "breached his fiduciary duties
through an act of defalcation, and [that] the debt arose on account of such breach" despite the fact
that the plaintiff had already proved breach of the duty to provide complete and accurate plan
information upon request and the resulting loss in a prior civil action).
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conclusive remedy against any ERISA fiduciaries filing for bankruptcy,
instead necessitating that plan participants still reprove their cases in filing
their creditors claims and likely producing inconsistent results27 7 between
groups of employee investors.
B. Sarbanes-Oxley Focuses Too Heavily on Prevention as Opposed to More
Expansive Avenues to Recover Losses Actually Sustained
Additionally, Sarbanes-Oxley may in fact cause a repeat performance of
the recent scandals, necessitating the adoption of more courses of redress,
not just prevention. One renowned commentator, William Niskanen of the
Cato Institute, posits that Sarbanes-Oxley will in fact produce dishonesty
among chief executive officers because the Act mandates personal
certification and affirmation of SEC filings, a time-intensive undertaking
which Niskanen believes "leads to risk aversion or lies., 278 "Sarbanes-Oxley
is clearly necessary but it's partly harmful and clearly insufficient.
279
"'What the stock exchange and government has done is accept prescriptions
of the corporate reform movement without evidence, and that gives people a
false sense of security that something has happened.... [Sarbanes-Oxley]
will have zero effect."
28 0
Moreover, Sarbanes-Oxley does not adequately address the need for
further controls over and redress for the conduct and decision-making of
program fiduciaries. While a much-needed step in the process of reform, the
legislative effort falls short of what is truly required to regain employee
investor confidence and effectively regulate the administration of employee
pension funds and other investment programs primarily based on the
acquisition of employer stock. Sarbanes-Oxley mirrors the purposes and
goals of the Regulation Fair Disclosure281 established before the wake of
corporate implosions, focusing on "stop[ping] conflicts of interest inside
firms. 282 However, that is "not the main game ... [and] [t]he rules should
277. Compare In re Whitcomb, 303 B.R. 806, 809-10 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 2004) (exemplifying the
ease with which Sarbanes-Oxley disposes of bankruptcy creditors' claims resulting from securities
fraud judgments), and Gibbons, 289 B.R. at 594-97, with Eisenberg, 189 B.R. at 730 (demonstrating
the reproving of the ERISA claims already adjudicated), and Eavenson v. Ramey, 243 BR. 160,
164-65 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (demonstrating the reproving of the ERISA claims already adjudicated).
278. See Sean Aylmer, Governed by Fear, AUSTRL. FIN. REV., Nov. 3, 2003, at 68 [hereinafter
Governed by Fear] (quoting Cato Institute Chairman William Niskanen).
279. Id. (quoting Cato Institute Chairman William Niskanen).
280. Id. (quoting Cato Institute Chairman William Niskanen). Niskanen fears that "investors and
bankers will think they [corporations] are doing enough to meet community corporate governance
standards by following the new rules ... [b]ut they need to do more." Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
be about shareholders getting the best return. '283 Accordingly, Sarbanes-
Oxley should have concentrated more on helping shareholders actually
maximize results and protections and less on simply requiring rote,
ministerial statements to purportedly maintain control over corporate
actions.2 4
C. Certain Groups of Employee Investors Still Have No Means of Redress
Sarbanes-Oxley still fails to account for certain groups of employee
investors and does not fully cover all major potential causes of action against
companies and the individuals comprising the corporation's governing body.
The legislature should have attempted to account for the interests of holders
of other deferred compensation plans not covered by ERISA or securities
laws, such as bonus stock and phantom stock plans, who also fell victim to
the fraudulent activities in the recent cases. Bonus plans and "phantom
stock" compensation have been excluded from the federal securities laws
causes of action.285 Those plaintiffs can potentially bring state law causes of
action for securities fraud, but are not entitled to take part in the
consolidated, streamlined federal proceedings currently underway.286 Thus
arguably, at the very least, phantom stock and the other employer stock
ownership interests falling without the protections of ERISA or securities
laws should warrant application of at least one of the statutory schemes to
provide some relief to the employees whose accounts were obliterated.287
While some may view the "phantom stock" and other stock bonus programs
as entirely outside the purview of either ERISA or securities laws, 288 the
reality exists that those plans constitute a part of an employee's
compensation package in one way or another, and thus should be afforded
some level of protection against fraudulent conduct. Nothing in the Act
covers such losses suffered: it simply modifies the regulations and remedies
pertaining to existing classes of programs.
D. Where ERISA Should Apply Concomitantly with Securities Laws so that
All Employee Investors Are Entitled to the Same Heightened Levels of
Protection
For one, Congress should have amended its laws and regulations to
more vigorously emphasize the importance of ensuring that pension
fiduciaries truly take all appropriate measures to diversify plan investments,
even outside of employer stock, because "employee-ownership makes an
employee's portfolio even less diversified as [it] compound[s] ... lack of
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See In re Enron Corp. Secs., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 636 n.123
(S.D. Tex. 2003).
286. See id.
287. See generally Bodie, supra note 15, at 599.
288. See In re Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 636 n.123.
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diversification by investing both human capital and financial capital,
whether through direct contributions or sacrificing pay and benefits, in the
same corporation." 289 The laws regulating the pension plan lockdowns that
caused so much of the disaster at Enron certainly help avoid a certain degree
of problems with undiversified investments, 290 but the fact remains that
establishing any claim for breach of fiduciary duty under the Moench abuse
of discretion standard presents an often insurmountable hurdle for plaintiffs
to prove. 9
If altering fiduciary standards is too drastic, at the very least Congress
should enact the pending proposal to require notice to participants where
plan assets are heavily invested in employer securities.292 Senator Evan
Bayh introduced a bill on November 19, 2003 which would add a subsection
to the existing ERISA mandates under 29 U.S.C. § 1025.293 The addition
would compel plan administrators to "include in the account statement a
notice that the account may be overinvested in employer securities" where
over fifty percent of plan assets are invested in employer stock or other
securities.294 The proposed amendment would serve to "provide information
and advice to pension plan participants to assist them in making decisions
regarding the investment of their pension plan assets, and for other
purposes." '295 The changes would not apply to an ESOP to the extent that it
does not include any 401(k) contributions, 296 meaning that pension-directed
account holders would be offered an element of needed statutory protection
especially where many plan agreements still rely significantly on employer
stock investments. Congress therefore has taken another small step towards
reform but should also seriously contemplate comparable further action to
aid employee investors.
Furthermore, corporate leaders should not avoid liability for material
misstatements made in private as opposed to the public at large that
nonetheless induce detrimental investor purchases. CEOs have perpetrated
huge frauds by virtue of their superior positions within the company. For
instance, plaintiffs have so far successfully alleged that Bernard Ebbers, the
WorldCom CEO during the relevant class period, knew of the crooked
accounting methods and the actual financial health of the company and
289. Blum, supra note 38, at 1554; see also Governed by Fear, supra note 278 (illustrating the
needs of corporate shareholders through a mutual fund example, calling for corporate governance
rules to promote better approaches to maximizing returns for shareholders instead of merely
mandating compliance).
290. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 306; see also supra notes 236-40 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 236-40 and accompanying text.
292. See S. 1892, 108th Cong. (2003).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
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authorized the improper statements, as he had millions of dollars to gain by
perpetrating the alleged scheme. 297  Andrew Fastow, the ex-chief financial
officer of Enron, has pleaded guilty to two counts of fraud and has likely
implicated recently-indicted Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, both former
chief executive officers '298 Worse, corporations' fraudulent activities often
wind their paths through investment banks and other outside analysts and
auditors who effectively aid and authorize the schemes in pursuit of personal
gain.299 Investment banks and analysts are "in the business of speaking to
the public about stock values" and face liability for misstatements. 3°° The
securities acts thus provide ample avenues to recovery, but unfortunately the
majority of employee shareholders will profit from few, if any, of the
methods of relief, as ERISA does not contain comparable provisions.
Certainly, individuals accused of various fraudulent activities leading to
depletion of employee investment accounts would prefer to argue for the
preemption of one statutory scheme over the other where the alleged conduct
implicates multiple causes of action. Defendants in the various litigations
combining alleged securities and ERISA causes of action have attempted to
argue that ERISA should not apply in cases involving the dissemination of
false or misleading SEC filings in violation of securities laws.3' Most
courts do not accept the defense that securities rules and regulations preclude
fiduciaries from fulfilling their fiduciary duties where the laws "conflict. 302
297. In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 392, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (explaining how the
"unique and substantial" gains Ebbers stood to profit from the scheme adequately pled scienter in
defending a motion to dismiss).
298. See Jen Rogers, Fastow and His Wife Plead Guilty: Ex-Enron CFO Agrees to Serve 10
Years, Cooperate with Authorities: Will Skilling and Lay Be Next?, CNN/MONEY, Jan. 14, 2004,
available at http://money.cnn.com/2004/01l/14/newslcompanies/enron-fastows/index.htm?cnn=yes;
Loren Steffy, What of Lay's Claims? Answers Lie in Valhalla, Hous. CHRON., July 8, 2004.
299. See In re WorldCom, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 404-06 (describing the "symbiotic relationship"
between WorldCom, its CEO Bernard Ebbers, the investment bank Salomon Smith Barney, and the
supposedly independent analyst Jack Grubman). Salomon Smith Barney apparently had entered into
an "illicit quid pro quo arrangement" with WorldCom, which perpetuated the fraud by allowing the
incorrect and entirely untruthful positive reports and SEC registration statements regarding
WorldCom's financial health to coax investors to purchase the securities in reliance on "reliable
advice from an independent analyst [Grubman] and trustworthy brokerage house [Salomon Smith
Barney]." Id. at 404. Enron too had close dealings with banks such as UBS Warburg, which also
now faces liability from its outside investors. See, e.g., Nikko Asset Mgmt. Co. v. UBS AG, 303 F.
Supp. 2d 456, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (involving a suit filed by a Japanese investment company who
had bought notes backed by Enron securities from the defendant investment bank).
300. In re WorldCom, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 428 (stating that "[t]hose who choose to speak... must
speak honestly-not in half-truths, in bad faith, or without a reasonable basis for their statements" in
explaining that the investment bank involved, Salomon Smith Barney, "spoke forcefully and
frequently about the value of WorldCom" and therefore could be held liable for such statements). It
must be noted as well that the injured investors must demonstrate that the misstatement caused their
loss. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2004).
301. See, e.g., Rankin v. Rots, 278 F. Supp. 2d 853, 873-78 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (discussing the
WorldCom and Enron litigations and the defendants' arguments); In re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA
Litig., 263 F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (rejecting the defendants' assertions and denying
motions to dismiss); In re Enron Corp. Secs., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 511-
12 (S.D. Tex. 2003); In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. ERISA Litig., No. COO-20030 RMW 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19473 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2002); Hull v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., No. 3:00-778-17,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22343, at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 9, 2001).
302. See, e.g., Rankin, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 873-78 (discussing the "conflict" between securities
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Therefore, ERISA and securities laws do not necessarily conflict with one
another, at least from the employee investor perspective in causes of action
alleging fraudulent SEC filings and other material misrepresentations. And
likewise, the statutory protections afforded under ERISA against similar
conduct should apply equally to other employee programs utilizing deferred
compensation, regardless of whether the method resembles an "investment"
rather than traditional pension programs.
E. The Positive Note: Sarbanes-Oxley Imposes Equalizing "Blackout
Period" Relief and Director Stock Activity Disclosure Requirements
Sarbanes-Oxley Act section 306 addressed concerns common to all
employee investors by modifying both federal securities laws30 3 and ERISA
provisions to effectively equalize the investing playing field between regular
employees and corporate executives by restricting "blackout" periods and
requiring disclosure of any securities purchases or sales by officers and
directors. In regards to the securities laws, section 306, codified in 15
U.S.C. § 7244 and supplemented by SEC implementation releases, prohibits
the trade of employer equity securities by directors and officers during
pension fund "blackouts," where "rank-and-file" employees cannot sell their
individual pension account3°4 company stock holdings. 35  "Blackout
periods" amount to three or more business days during which the plan
fiduciary or security issuer precludes half or more of the company's
individual account plan participants or beneficiaries from buying, selling, or
otherwise transferring interests in the company equity security.30 6 Even
laws and ERISA and deciding that the duties under the two statutory schemes "can exist
concomitantly" in rejecting outright the defendants' argument); In re WorldCom, 263 F. Supp. 2d at
753 (rejecting the defendants' assertions and denying motions to dismiss); In re Enron, 284 F. Supp.
2d at 511-12; Hull, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22343, at *1 (allowing the argument but dismissing on
other grounds). But cf In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. ERISA Litig., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19473, at
*5 (deeming defendants' argument correct in dismissing plaintiffs' claims).
303. 15 U.S.C. § 7244 (2004).
304. Individual account plans are defined under ERISA § 3(34) (codified as 29 U.S.C. §
1002(34)).
305. Sarbanes-Oxley Act section 306 (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 7244(a)(1)) provides:
Except to the extent otherwise provided by rule of the Commission pursuant to paragraph
(3) [authorizing the SEC to promulgate clarifying supplementary rules], it shall be
unlawful for any director or executive officer of an issuer of any equity security (other
than an exempted security), directly or indirectly, to purchase, sell, or otherwise acquire
or transfer any equity security of the issuer (other than an exempted security) during any
blackout period with respect to such equity security if such director or officer acquires
such equity security in connection with his or her service or employment as a director or
executive officer.
Id.
306. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 306(a)(4)(A) (codified as § 7244(a)(4)(A)). The Act also enumerates
certain exceptions to this general rule, such as when the blackout is "regularly scheduled," meaning
"incorporated into the individual account plan" and "timely disclosed to employees."
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though it was scheduled to change administrators, the blackout period in the
Enron scenario amplified the losses, as the plan values "plummeted along
with [the] stock price" and no regular employees could alter their investment
portfolios. °7 Section 306 also provides a shareholder derivative cause of
action against any executive in violation of the provision.30 ' Thus Sarbanes-
Oxley eliminates the inequality of investment transfer rights between
ordinary employees and those at the top, as everyone alike now must forego
the ability to alter the employer securities component of their investment
portfolios during the blackout periods.
Furthermore, Sarbanes-Oxley even amends ERISA to require specific
notice to plan participants of upcoming blackout periods. In particular, the
Act mandates that the plan administrator provide at least thirty days notice' °9
of the suspension 310 to plan participants and beneficiaries of individual
account plans31' absent extraordinary circumstances. 31 2 Plan administrators
also now face civil penalties where they fail to meet the thirty-day notice
requirement.3 13 The Act therefore affords employee investors some form of
protection from arbitrary and unexpected blackouts, which constituted a
large part of the "galling" situations witnessed at Enron and Global
Crossing, where employees sat and "helplessly watch[ed] the[ir] stock's
value plummet[,]" unable to stop the financial hemorrhaging.1 Sarbanes-
Oxley thus also gives the employee investor the opportunity to "prepare" for
§ 306(a)(4)(B)(i)(I)-(II). The Act also does not preclude transfers by directors or officers where the
blackout is imposed for reasons of mergers, acquisitions, and other such transactions "involving the
plan or plan sponsor" by which persons become or cease to be plan participants or beneficiaries. §
306(a)(4)(B)(ii).
307. ENRON: THE RISE AND FALL, supra note 1, at 289. The Enron plaintiffs have alleged as
follows:
According to the complaint, during the Iockdown, plan participants were unable to move
their investments from one plan investment fund to another despite exigent circumstances
that made the blackout imprudent. The complaint asserts that Northern Trust [the named
fiduciary] exercised authority and control over the plan assets by imposing the lockdown,
which it had the ability to stop or delay, and that by not stopping or delaying that
lockdown, Northern Trust breached its fiduciary duties to plan participants.
In re Enron Corp. Secs., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 534 n.10 (S.D. Tex.
2003).
308. 15 U.S.C. § 7244(2)(B) (2004).
309. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 306(b)(2)(B).
310. Id. at § 306(b)(7). Section 306(b)(7) defines "blackout period" for ERISA purposes slightly
differently from the analogous securities application under section 306(a)(4), also excluding
restrictions "by reason of the application of the securities laws" and restrictions applicable to
singular individual participants or beneficiaries. Id. at § 306(b)(7)(B)(i), (iii).
311. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 306(b) (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 7244(b)).
312. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 306(b)(2)(C). The thirty-day requisite notice is thus not entirely
inflexible, as the Act also allows exceptions where a fiduciary determines that delaying the blackout
would violate the fiduciary duties under ERISA § 404(a)(1) as well as where unanticipated events or
"circumstances beyond the reasonable control of the plan administrator" render thirty-day notice
impossible, as long as both exceptions are memorialized in writing by a plan fiduciary. Id.
313. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 306(b)(3) (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)). The plan
administrator can face up to $100 per day per participant for his failure to provide adequate notice,
adding to the civil penalties under 29 U.S.C. § 1132. Id. at § 306(b)(3)(C) (codified as 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(7)).
314. See Bost, supra note 2, at 12 (describing the blackout situation generally).
718
[Vol. 32: 671, 2005] It's Payback Time, or Is It?
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
the blackout in a sense by mandating thirty days notice, as the plan
participant can choose to change his investment portfolio in anticipation of
the freeze.3" 5
Moreover, Sarbanes-Oxley also requires that directors, officers, and
shareholders owning ten percent or more of the company disclose their stock
sales to the Securities and Exchange Commission before the close of the
second business day after the sale.3 16 The provision likely serves to assist
both intra-company and public investors in recognizing and reacting to any
potential signals from insider transactions indicating that the stock prices
may decline and thus in turn eliminate the potential for "insiders" to gain
any substantial unfair advantage by selling off earlier than the rest of the
market, theoretically at a higher price.
Thus, if anything, Sarbanes-Oxley supposedly instills a heightened
sense of care on the part of corporate directors and officers towards all
shareholders. Recent litigations "suggest that directors must take their
responsibilities seriously in the post-Enron era., 317  For example, certain
pending state court litigations have imposed striking restrictions on the
common law "business judgment rule," which generally allows corporate
fiduciaries "exculpatory" leeway in decision-making.31 8 The Act has put
corporations and their agents on notice that they are being watched
externally and internally, and that the financial world does not want to see
another Enron- or WorldCom-type event occur.
315. See id.; see also In re Enron Corp. Secs., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511,
534 & n.10 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (describing generally the lockdown situation and detailing how the
employees wanted to transfer out of the Enron stock but could not).
316. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 403 (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(l)-(4)); see also Bost, supra note
2, at 18 (calling the change from ten days to two days a "drastic shortening").
317. Robert Reder & Scott Edelman, Courts Turn Up Corporate Heat: Recent Judicial
Developments Impacting Corporate Governance and Director Liability, THE CORPORATE
COUNSELLOR, Sept. 12, 2003, at I (hereinafter Courts Turn Up Corporate Heat).
318. See id. (citing In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, No. 15452, U.S. Dist. (D. Del.
May 28, 2003), In re Abbott Laboratories Derivative Shareholders Litigation, 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir.
2003), and Pereira v. Cogan, 294 B.R. 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), as "potentially limit[ing] the scope of
the protections provided to directors by the business judgment rule, as well as the protections
afforded by 'exculpatory' provisions that are expressly provided for by state corporate statutes in
order to shield directors from liability for breaches of their duty of care"). The courts in the cited
cases have all imposed more stringent requirements on the fiduciary duties of corporate directors,
theoretically to reflect Congress and the policies of Sarbanes-Oxley. Id. ("[T]hese cases signal that
directors will not be shielded from liability by exculpatory charter clauses where it can be
demonstrated that they have consciously disregarded their duties ... [and] [t]he message is really
rather simple: the job of the corporate director is ... to safeguard the interests of the
shareholders ....").
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VI. WIDER IMPACT- THE POST-SCANDAL LANDSCAPE AND THE OUTLOOK
FOR THE EMPLOYEE INVESTMENT FUTURE
A. Psychology of the Market: Why Employee Investors Will Still Need
Protections to Safeguard Their Futures in the Post-Enron Era
Taking the "preemptive strike" approach such as Sarbanes-Oxley,
discovering and correcting the cause of the recent corporate scandals may
aid averting further economic destruction. Understanding the labor and
employment environment as well as the financial landscape may provide
more valuable insight into why the events of 2001-2002 occurred and thus
why they may happen again, necessitating a more comprehensive system of
protection for EIAP participants.
1. Are Public Investors Putting Too Much Pressure on Corporations to
"Perform," Leaving Employee Investors to Bear the Burden?
Without a doubt, the enormous gains seen at Enron, WorldCom, Global
Crossing, and others in their heydays gave investors, both employee and
public, a taste of sky-high returns and dreams (and often realities) of great
wealth.319 Stocks would double, even triple and quadruple in short time, and
investors were happy. 320 Employees were increasingly becoming significant
shareholders, literally "buying into" the craze and the incredible successes of
the companies which they were helping to build. But such prosperity bred
pressure to continue to perform, and likely promulgated the insatiable need
for higher returns that characterized the pre-collapse era.
Such pressure may reappear in the near future, however, as companies
and their employees feel pressured to regain the "status" and prosperity they
rode during the late 1990's, when the technology sector was in full swing
and pre-Enron. Accordingly, the post-September 11 market fallouts may in
fact exacerbate the situation, as corporations struggle to get back on their
feet and attain once more the successes of the last decade. In turn, such an
environment seems ripe for inappropriate, even desperate, conduct on the
part of corporations to regain the confidence of public investors and achieve
even higher returns. At the very least, corporations also may opt not to
maintain ESOPs and other stock programs falling within the ambit of the
securities laws for fear of heightened liability, as opposed to traditional
ERISA plans. In any case, the employees will once again bear the burden,
through the continued lack of adequate civil remedies and potentially with
restricted investment choices.
319. See generally ANATOMY OF GREED, supra note 218.
320. Id.
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2. Or Are Directors Simply Greedy?
Undisputedly, the corporate world changed forever in October 2001. It
cannot be denied that the investor of today, whether public or employee, is
not the same person with the same confidence and vigor of the pre-Enron
investor.32'
Think back to one year ago [September 2001]. Think of all that has
occurred since 9/11/01 in the financial markets, in corporate
America, in your own portfolio. That is how the end of an awesome
innocence looks... [T]he euphoria that characterized investing in
the late 1990's is gone; that wide-eyed acceptance of every word
corporate executives uttered, of every financial statement they
released, of every outlandish projection an analyst made has been
replaced by a sense that trust must once again be earned, that
skepticism is a worthy trait, that the advice of analysts can be
costly.
3 22
Undoubtedly, American employee investors, like their public
marketplace counterparts, have not felt the same since the demise of Enron
and its contemporaries.323 Employee investors suffered arguably worse
losses as a result of the collapses, as they had invested not only financial and
emotional resources into their companies but thus also had "proudly" placed
their futures in the supposedly trustworthy hands of their employers,324 only
to witness everything disappear before their eyes. It is one thing to lose a
financial investment, almost like a gamble in black-jack or roulette, but it is
an entirely different story where entire livelihoods and emotional
investments vanish unexpectedly in a matter of days, leaving hard work and
dedication amounting to nothing in the end.325
321. Gretchen Morgenson, Market Watch: Rebound from Ruin, If Not from Distrust, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 2002, at 3 [hereinafter Rebound from Ruin].
322. Id. (deploring the lost sense of trust while congratulating investors for learning from the
mistakes and continuing their push to recover from scandal and September 11). "At the same time
that all Americans were forced to confront the fact of their country's vulnerability, investors were
also made to understand how much about the markets and the companies they owned had been
illusory in recent years." Id.
323. See Hill v. BellSouth Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1368 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (stating that "the
markets are more unwilling than ever to tolerate corporate misstatements of earnings" in a case
involving restatements of results of investments in Latin America).
324. ENRON: THE RISE AND FALL, supra note 1, at 290 ("Enron's active touting of own stock to its
own workforce apparently worked. Employees who were filled with pride about working for Enron
also proudly invested 401(k) money in Enron's stock.... [As one employee stated:] 'They were
always talking about the stock price ... [and] always said the stock was undervalued."'); see also
Blum, supra note 38, at 1549 (distinguishing the employee-investor risk as one of "human capital"
as opposed to financial stakes).
325. One columnist harshly summed up the circumstances: "In a matter of months, a bad crop of
The nature of these recent scandals took the corporate world by surprise
as well, with a markedly more insipid and seemingly widespread character
than any prior situation. Wall Street and the securities marketplace have
witnessed financial implosions in the past. For one, Wall Street firms
crumbled in the 1970's due to "technological incompetence and lack of
capital. 32 6 And the 1980's saw plenty of greed and the implosion of firms
such as Drexel Burnham Lambert in addition to the Savings and Loan
scandal.327 But the recent debacles have caused clearly more marked
disasters for investor confidence. 328  As world-renowned financier Felix
Rohatyn stated, the previous collapses "didn't cost 50,000 jobs, people's
savings and a decline in market value of trillions of dollars ... [t]his
[situation] is not about a bunch of rogue C.E.O.s. ''3 29 And worse, it even
seems that the alarming epidemic spread still, even overseas, as Europe's
Parmalat now stands under investigation for the "disappearance" of 10
billion Euros, earning the Italian giant the nickname "Europe's Enron."
330
The corporate world has seemingly been orchestrating a con scheme that
dwarfs even the most infamous of past frauds, this time tapping into and
stealing from the very human resources that drive their success.
B. Effects on the Already-Struggling Economy: Why the Merely Preventive
Measures of Sarbanes-Oxley May Do More Harm than Good at this
Juncture
On a related note, another major concern regards the economic effects
that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and any further legislation may have on
corporate risk in the current down economy, a fact which in turn will stifle
any financial gains to existing pension and stock funds. The provisions of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act resulting from the Enron and WorldCom debacles
U.S. corporate executives incinerated trillions of dollars in wealth and destroyed the lives of
thousands of innocent employees." Pinstripes to Prison Stripes, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2004, at B-14.
326. Rebound from Ruin, supra note 321.
327. See id.
328. Id. (citing notable financier Felix Rohatyn and calling the Enron and WorldCom legacies a
"greater and longer-lasting impact on the economy" than previous scandals because they involved
"venerable financial institutions... at the heart of the... debacles").
329. Id. Morgenson actually describes the root of the problem as a risk "from within our shores,
not without[,] ... emanat[ing] from the people in positions of power at corporations who cheat their
shareholders, lie to investors and make millions in outsized compensation or well-timed stock sales
just before their games are exposed." Id.
330. Deborah Hargreaves, Market Insight: Impact of 'Europe's Enron' Pales Next to the Original,
THE FIN. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2004, at 44. The silver lining in the new scandal in Italy is that "investors
have been under few illusions about Italian companies" unlike the traditional trust in American
corporate governance that caught so many people off guard with the fall of the giants here in the
U.S. Id. Apparently Parmalat is not alone either. Royal Dutch/Shell Group recently disclosed that
it had "overstated proven energy reserves by 20 percent" and the Swiss giant Adecco appears to be
currently "unraveling" under allegations of improper bookkeeping. An Enron Plea That
Reverberates, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2004, at F2 (calling the recent European scandals the "Chapter
2" to Enron's "first chapter in the corporate scandal saga"); see also In re Royal Ahold N.V. Secs. &
ERISA Litig., 219 F.R.D. 343, 343 (D. Md. 2003) (involving another Dutch company initially
restating its earnings by over $500 million and misstating its losses by almost $2 billion).
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have placed markedly "heightened duties" on companies, their management,
directors, and audit committee members and thus "enhanced exposure to risk
in the post-Enron climate. 331 In turn, the economy will take longer to pick
up, as capital spending remains "muted," a likely result of the new aversion
to risk taking post-Sarbanes-Oxley enactment into law.332 Sarbanes-Oxley
thus may in fact hinder corporate investment by its more stringent
regulations and therefore slow the road to economic recovery, still chilling
the success of employee savings and investment programs.333 Pension plans
on the whole have suffered in the past few years due to the stock market
slump in addition to the dollar's weak position,334 and at this point in time
the Act will not ameliorate the financial situation.
Moreover, the legislation is slow to work, especially given poor
economic timing, and will provide smaller returns. As one analyst
sarcastically stated, despite the potential drawbacks of audit and other
controls that seem to draw out the economic stagnation, "[t]he payback is a
better functioning capital market. It's much better than just rolling the
dice. '335 Sarbanes-Oxley will likely procure "more secure investments for
shareholders but lower returns, 33 6 a mixed-blessing for the ESOP
participants but to no avail for other EIAP participants. In the end,
Sarbanes-Oxley provides a step toward reaching much-needed reform for
employee investment programs, but it in no way delivers all of the
adjustments necessary to creating a safer, more successful environment for
employee deferred compensation plans. Courts have already lobbed the ball
331. Raphael Grunfeld, Who Wants to Be on the Audit Committee? Sarbanes-Oxley Imposes
Heightened Duties While Clearly Delineating Parameters, N.Y. L. J. (May 5, 2003) (positing that
audit committees post-Sarbanes-Oxley will indeed exercise more control over corporations and their
directors and hopefully aid in the protection of investors but will in turn face significantly increased
personal liabilities).
332. See Governed by Fear, supra note 278, at 68.
333. Id. As stated by one expert, Sarbanes-Oxley has caused unnecessary delays in economic
recovery because it engendered "reluctance [in] managements to take the risks and make the
investments that had previously brought the economy roaring back from periods of stagnation or
recession." Id.
334. Pension Assets Climb to $14.2 Trillion Worldwide; Last Year's Gains Did Not Close Deficits
a Report Says a Full Recovery may Be Several Years Away, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2004, at C3. One
analyst said, "'The damage to global pension funds has been severe' ... [and] '[r]ecovery to full
funding levels is very likely to be several years off."' Id. (quoting head of Watson Wyatt's global
investment practice, Roger Urwin, explaining the current pension fund market).
335. See Governed by Fear, supra note 278 (quoting a PricewaterhouseCoopers analyst who
believes that those who believe that Sarbanes-Oxley's requirements may be "costly" neglect the
benefit of "less risk to the investors").
336. Id. (quoting an analyst who stated that investors habituated to giant returns will have to
adapt to the lower rates of the new era).
to Congress, who must now pick it up from the net and serve it back with
added reforms.337
VII. CONCLUSION
After all the smoke has cleared, employee investors from the imploded
corporations must simply sit back and wait to see what restitution they can
recover from the bankrupt companies, if anything at all. Ongoing criminal
investigations and guilty pleas of key corporate officers and directors
responsible for the mayhem only add to the tragic nature of the situation, as
yet more lives and families are destroyed. 38 Some feel frustration over the
seemingly inconsistent standards in securities fraud proceedings, as many
top executives have yet to face criminal charges, leaving the employees still
without some vindication.Y Moreover, the employees do not have a true
light at the end of the tunnel to recovery at this point in time. Criminal
investigations and trials provide some solace,340 but the fact remains that the
employees stand low on the priority list of creditors and claimants, with only
the hopes that they will regain a fraction of what they lost in any
settlement.34 1
In the end, the road to recovery is long and remains to be seen. While
Sarbanes-Oxley may work to prevent future scandal and investor losses,
342
"the damage to investor confidence has been done''343 and is not likely to
recover anytime in the near future. Moreover, the employee investor, a
creature built on the idea of promoting loyalty and incentive to work harder
through ownership in an entity, may never fully regain the trust in the
corporation and its governance, thereby eviscerating the very purpose and
inspiration to the theory behind employee ownership programs in the first
337. See S. 1892, 108th Cong. (2003) (calling for mandatory disclosure under ERISA where
savings plans invest more than fifty percent of plan assets in the employer's securities).
338. An Enron Plea That Reverberates, supra note 330 (describing Andrew and Lea Fastow's
guilty pleas entered so as to avoid simultaneous sentences and allow at least one parent to stay at
home with their young children).
339. The Bigger They Are (The less likely are they to fall), Editorial, N.J. L. J. (Aug. 25, 2003)
(articulating the frustration with the fact that the chief executives and top banks involved in the
Enron and WorldCom scandals have yet to face any criminal penalties while Martha Stewart, who
fraudulently obtained only $40K, is prosecuted).
340. An Enron Plea That Reverberates, supra note 330 (remarking that by confessing to
"collu[sion] with 'members of Enron's senior management,' Andrew Fastow's guilty plea
"signalled] a hunt drawing to its conclusion," in reference to the likelihood that Fastow's proffered
information will implicate Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling).
341. Mary Flood, The Fall of Enron: Recovery Is Closer for Retirement Cash, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, May 21, 2004, at 9B; Purva Patel, Judge Gives Preliminary Approval to Enron
Settlement Deal, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Feb. 5, 2005, available at http://www.chron.comcs/CDA/
ssistory.mpl/special/enron/3025289 (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) (outlining the proposed settlement);
see also Ben White, Directors Run Risk of Paying Penalties Out of Their Pockets, WASH. POST, Jan.
20, 2005, at El (discussing the impact of settlements in Enron and WorldCom).
342. See Floyd Norris, Still Another Accounting Scandal, but With a Difference, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
17, 2004, at C1 (positing that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act should work to avoid a "new breed" of
accounting problems, namely those where company management keeps corporate disclosures
inadequate and thus conceals true financial status).
343. Id.
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place. While Congress has attempted to ameliorate some concerns, it has
not gone far enough to remedy the destruction that has taken place. Instead,
the corporate world will have to redeem itself in the eyes of its workforce
only by proving that the recent fraudulent acts of the various giants such as
Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and others were no more than the singular and
isolated conduct of a few individuals and not the products of a systemic
scheme to leave unrewarded the very human capital and skill that produced
the profitable basis upon which the directors launched their frauds. No
longer will employees blindly put their money into a company, believing
without question that their financial interests will necessarily be adequately
protected by the company or its directors, instead holding predisposed
suspicions that the entity seeks to profit at their expense and worrying that
they may have no means of recovering such losses. Thus, Enron and its
contemporaries marked the end of an "awesome innocence '44 in employee
investments.
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